FATF and FSRBs Updates

High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action

High-risk jurisdictions have significant strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and financing of proliferation. For all countries identified as high-risk, the FATF calls on all members and urges all jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence, and, in the most serious cases, countries are called upon to apply counter-measures to protect the international financial system from the money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing (ML/TF/PF) risks emanating from the country. This list is often externally referred to as the “black list”.

Since February 2020, Iran reported in January and August 2024 with no material changes in the status of its action plan.

Given heightened proliferation financing risks, the FATF reiterates its call to apply countermeasures on these high-risk jurisdictions.

Jurisdictions subject to a FATF call on its members and other jurisdictions to apply countermeasures

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)

Building upon the FATF statements over the past decade, the FATF remains concerned by the DPRK’s continued failure to address the significant deficiencies in its anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime and the serious threats posed by the DPRK’s illicit activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and its financing.

The FATF has continually reiterated since 2011 the need for all countries to robustly implement the targeted financial sanctions in accordance with UNSC Resolutions and apply the following countermeasures to protect their financial systems from the money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing threat emanating from DPRK: 

·         Terminate correspondent relationships with DPRK banks;

·         Close any subsidiaries or branches of DPRK banks in their countries; and

·         Limit business relationships & financial transactions with DPRK persons. 

Despite these calls, DPRK has increased connectivity with the international financial system, which raises proliferation financing (PF) risks, as the FATF noted in February 2024. This requires greater vigilance and renewed implementation and enforcement of these countermeasures against the DPRK. As set out in UNSCR 2270, DPRK frequently uses front companies, shell companies, joint ventures and complex, opaque ownership structures for the purpose of violating sanctions. As such, FATF encourages its members and all countries to apply enhanced due diligence to the DPRK and its ability to facilitate transactions on its behalf.

The FATF also urges countries to adequately assess and account for the increased proliferation financing risk with the greater financial connectivity reported, particularly since the next round of assessments requires countries to adequately assess PF risks under Recommendation 1 and Immediate Outcome 11. The ability to obtain reliable and credible information to support the assessment of PF risks relating to the DPRK is hampered by the recent termination of the 1718 Committee Panel of Experts mandate. Thus, the FATF will monitor the measures to comply with DPRK targeted financial sanctions and the implementation of countermeasures against DPRK.

IRAN

In June 2016, Iran committed to address its strategic deficiencies. Iran’s action plan expired in January 2018. In February 2020, the FATF noted Iran has not completed the action plan.[1]

In October 2019, the FATF called upon its members and urged all jurisdictions to: require increased supervisory examination for branches and subsidiaries of financial institutions based in Iran; introduce enhanced relevant reporting mechanisms or systematic reporting of financial transactions; and require increased external audit requirements for financial groups with respect to any of their branches and subsidiaries located in Iran.

Now, given Iran’s failure to enact the Palermo and Terrorist Financing Conventions in line with the FATF Standards, the FATF fully lifts the suspension of countermeasures and calls on its members and urges all jurisdictions to apply effective countermeasures, in line with Recommendation 19.[2]

Iran will remain on the FATF statement on High Risk Jurisdictions Subject to a Call for Action until the full Action Plan has been completed. If Iran ratifies the Palermo and Terrorist Financing Conventions, in line with the FATF standards, the FATF will decide on next steps, including whether to suspend countermeasures. Until Iran implements the measures required to address the deficiencies identified with respect to countering terrorism-financing in the Action Plan, the FATF will remain concerned with the terrorist financing risk emanating from Iran and the threat this poses to the international financial system.

[1] In June 2016, the FATF welcomed Iran’s high-level political commitment to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, and its decision to seek technical assistance in the implementation of the Action Plan. Since 2016, Iran established a cash declaration regime, enacted amendments to its Counter-Terrorist Financing Act and its Anti-Money Laundering Act, and adopted an AML by-law.

In February 2020, the FATF noted that there are still items not completed and Iran should fully address: (1) adequately criminalizing terrorist financing, including by removing the exemption for designated groups “attempting to end foreign occupation, colonialism and racism”; (2) identifying and freezing terrorist assets in line with the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions; (3) ensuring an adequate and enforceable customer due diligence regime; (4) demonstrating how authorities are identifying and sanctioning unlicensed money/value transfer service providers; (5) ratifying and implementing the Palermo and TF Conventions and clarifying the capability to provide mutual legal assistance; and (6) ensuring that financial institutions verify that wire transfers contain complete originator and beneficiary information.

[2] Countries should be able to apply appropriate countermeasures when called upon to do so by the FATF. Countries should also be able to apply countermeasures independently of any call by the FATF to do so. Such countermeasures should be effective and proportionate to the risks.

The Interpretative Note to Recommendation 19 specifies examples of the countermeasures that could be undertaken by countries.

Jurisdiction subject to a FATF call on its members and other jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence measures proportionate to the risks arising from the jurisdiction

MYANMAR

In February 2020, Myanmar committed to address its strategic deficiencies. Myanmar’s action plan expired in September 2021. 

In October 2022, given the continued lack of progress and the majority of its action items still not addressed after a year beyond the action plan deadline, the FATF decided that further action was necessary in line with its procedures and FATF calls on its members and other jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence measures proportionate to the risk arising from Myanmar. The FATF requires that as part of enhanced due diligence, financial institutions should increase the degree and nature of monitoring of the business relationship, in order to determine whether those transactions or activities appear unusual or suspicious. If no further progress is made by June 2025, the FATF will consider countermeasures.

While overall progress continues to be slow, Myanmar has made recent progress against one item in its action plan by addressing technical compliance deficiencies regarding targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation financing. Myanmar should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address these deficiencies, including by: (1) demonstrating enhanced use of financial intelligence in law enforcement authorities (LEAs) investigations, and increasing operational analysis and disseminations by the financial intelligence unit (FIU); (2) ensuring that ML is investigated/prosecuted in line with risks; (3) demonstrating investigation of transnational ML cases with international cooperation; (4) demonstrating an increase in the freezing/seizing and confiscation of criminal proceeds, instrumentalities, and/or property of equivalent value; and (5) managing seized assets to preserve the value of seized goods until confiscation.

When applying enhanced due diligence, countries should ensure that flows of funds for humanitarian assistance, legitimate NPO activity and remittances are neither disrupted nor discouraged. The FATF will also continue to monitor whether Myanmar’s AML/CFT activities apply undue scrutiny to legitimate financial flows. 

Myanmar will remain on the list of countries subject to a call for action until its full action plan is completed.

To obtain access to the full publication by the FATF click on the link below.

https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/fatf-gafi/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/Call-for-action-february-2025.html

Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring

Jurisdictions under increased monitoring are actively working with the FATF to address strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing. When the FATF places a jurisdiction under increased monitoring, it means the country has committed to resolve swiftly the identified strategic deficiencies within agreed timeframes and is subject to increased monitoring. This list is often externally referred to as the “grey list”.

The FATF and FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs) continue to work with the jurisdictions below as they report on the progress achieved in addressing their strategic deficiencies. The FATF calls on these jurisdictions to complete their action plans expeditiously and within the agreed timeframes. The FATF welcomes their commitment and will closely monitor their progress. The FATF does not call for the application of enhanced due diligence measures to be applied to these jurisdictions. The FATF Standards do not envisage de-risking, or cutting-off entire classes of customers, but call for the application of a risk-based approach. Therefore, the FATF encourages its members and all jurisdictions to take into account the information presented below in their risk analysis. As countries consider actions based on their risk analysis taking into account the information below, they should ensure that flows of funds for humanitarian assistance, legitimate NPO activity and remittances are neither disrupted nor discouraged. Countries should also consider their international obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolution 2761 (2024) on humanitarian exemptions to asset freeze measures imposed by UN sanctions regimes.

The FATF identifies additional jurisdictions, on an on-going basis, that have strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing. A number of jurisdictions have not yet been reviewed by the FATF or their FSRBs, but will be in due course. 

The FATF provides some flexibility to jurisdictions not facing immediate deadlines to report progress on a voluntary basis. The following countries had their progress reviewed by the FATF since October 2024: Bulgaria; Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Croatia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia; Nigeria, Philippines, South Africa, South Sudan, Tanzania, Venezuela, and Vietnam. For these countries, updated statements are provided below. Algeria, Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti, Lebanon, Monaco, Syria and Yemen chose to defer reporting; thus, the statements issued previously for those jurisdictions are included below, but it may not necessarily reflect the most recent status of the jurisdictions’ AML/CFT regimes. Following review, the FATF now also identifies Lao PDR and Nepal.

ALGERIA

(Statement from October 2024) 

In October 2024, Algeria made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its mutual evaluation report (MER) in May 2023, Algeria has made progress on many of the MER’s recommended actions including by more effectively pursuing money laundering investigations and prosecutions. Algeria will continue to work with FATF to implement its action plan by: (1) improving risk-based supervision, especially for higher risk sectors, including through the adoption of new procedures, risk assessments, supervision manuals and guidelines, as well as undertaking inspections and applying effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions; (2) developing an effective framework for basic and beneficial ownership information; (3) enhancing its regime for suspicious transaction reports; (4) establishing an effective legal and institutional framework for targeted financial sanctions for terrorism financing; and (5) implementing a risk-based approach to oversight of non-profit organisations, without disrupting or discouraging legitimate activity.

ANGOLA

(Statement from October 2024) 

In October 2024, Angola made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its MER in June 2023, Angola has made progress on some of the MER’s recommended actions including enhancing national cooperation and coordination, international cooperation and the use of financial intelligence by competent authorities. Angola will continue to work with the FATF to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) enhancing its understanding of ML/TF risks; (2) improving risk-based supervision of non-financial banking entities and DNFBPs; (3) ensuring competent authorities have adequate, accurate and timely access to beneficial ownership information and that breaches to obligations are adequately addressed; (4) demonstrating an increase in ML investigations and prosecutions; (5) demonstrating the ability to identify, investigate and prosecute TF; and (6) demonstrating an effective process to implement targeted financial sanctions without delay.

BULGARIA

Since October 2023, when Bulgaria made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MONEYVAL to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Bulgaria has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by ensuring that the beneficial ownership information held in its Register is accurate and up-to-date and by identifying the subset of non-profit organisations (NPOs) most vulnerable to TF abuse. Bulgaria should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) addressing the remaining technical compliance deficiencies; (2) improving investigations and prosecutions of different types of money laundering in line with risks, including high-scale corruption and organised crime; (3) ensuring the ability to conduct parallel financial investigations in all terrorism investigations; (4) addressing gaps in the PF TFS frameworks; and (5) demonstrating initial implementation of risk-based monitoring of NPOs to prevent abuse for TF purposes. 

BURKINA FASO

In February 2021, Burkina Faso made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Burkina Faso should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its remaining strategic deficiency, by implementing an effective targeted financial sanctions regime related to TF and PF.

The FATF notes Burkina Faso’s continued progress across its action plan, however all deadlines have expired and work remains. The FATF urges Burkina Faso to swiftly implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiency as soon as possible as all deadlines expired in December 2022.

CAMEROON

In June 2023, Cameroon made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GABAC to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Cameroon has taken steps to improve its AML/CFT regime by aligning AML/CFT national strategies and policies with the findings of the NRA; demonstrating AML/CFT cooperation and coordination between competent authorities; improving risk-based prioritisation of incoming international cooperation, and establishing a regime for violations of transparency obligations applicable to legal persons. Cameroon should continue working on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) enhancing risk-based supervision of banks and implementing effective risk-based supervision for non-bank FIs and DNFBPs, and conducting appropriate outreach to high-risk FIs and DNFBPs; (2) maintaining and ensuring timely access by competent authorities to adequate and up to date beneficial ownership information on legal persons; (3) enhancing secure information exchange between the FIU, reporting entities and competent authorities and demonstrating an increase in dissemination of intelligence reports to support operational needs of competent authorities; (4) demonstrating that authorities are able to conduct a range of ML investigations, and prosecute ML in line with risks; (5) implementing policies and procedures for seizing and confiscating proceeds and instrumentalities of crime and managing frozen, seized and confiscated property, and prioritising seizure and confiscation of assets at the border; (6) demonstrating that TF investigations and prosecutions are pursued in line with risk; and (7) demonstrating effective implementation of TF and PF TFS regimes and implementing a risk-based approach to NPOs without disrupting legitimate NPO activities.  

CÔTE D'IVOIRE

(Statement from October 2024) 

In October 2024, Côte d’Ivoire made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its MER in June 2023, Côte d’Ivoire has made significant progress on many of the MER’s recommended actions including by strengthening its legal AML/CFT framework through several important legislative and regulatory amendments, updating ML/TF analysis by drafting typology reports on the highest risk predicate offences, strengthening the human and technical resources of the FIU and prosecutors, and operationalising the agency in charge of the management of assets seized and confiscated. Côte d’Ivoire will continue to work with the FATF to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) enhancing its use of international cooperation in ML/TF investigations and prosecutions; (2) improving the implementation of risk-based supervision of financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and professions and conducting outreach campaigns to improve compliance; (3) improving the verification and access of basic and beneficial ownership information of legal persons and applying sanctions in case of violation; (4) enhancing the use of financial intelligence by law enforcement authorities and improving disseminations by the FIU; (5) demonstrating a sustained increase in the number of ML and TF investigations and prosecutions of different types in line with the country’s risk profile; and (6) strengthening the targeted financial sanctions framework. 

CROATIA

In June 2023, Croatia made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MONEYVAL to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. At its February 2025 Plenary, the FATF made the initial determination that Croatia has substantially completed its action plan and warrants an on-site assessment to verify that the implementation of AML/CFT reforms has begun and is being sustained, and that the necessary political commitment remains in place to sustain implementation in the future.

Croatia has made the following key reforms including: (1) completing the national risk assessment, including assessing the ML/TF risk associated with the misuse of legal persons and legal arrangements and the use of cash in the real estate sector; (2) increasing FIU human resources and improving analytical capabilities; (3) continuing to improve LEA detection, investigation and prosecution of different types of ML, including ML involving foreign predicate offences and the misuse of legal persons; (4) demonstrating a sustained increase in the application of provisional measures in securing direct/indirect proceeds, as well as foreign proceeds subject to confiscation; (5) demonstrating the ability to systematically detect and where relevant investigate TF in line with its risk profile; (6) establishing a national framework for the implementation of UN TFS measures and providing guidance and conducting outreach and training to reporting entities; and (7) identifying the subset of NPOs most vulnerable to TF abuse and providing targeted outreach to NPOs and to the donor community on potential vulnerabilities of NPOs to TF abuse.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Since October 2022, when the DRC made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GABAC to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, the DRC has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by establishing a mechanism to promote interagency coordination and cooperation on both ML and TF at the operational level. The DRC should continue to work to implement its FATF action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) developing and implementing a risk-based supervision plan; (2) building the capacity of the FIU to conduct operational and strategic analysis; (3) strengthening the capabilities of authorities involved in the investigation and prosecution of ML and TF; and (4) demonstrating effective implementation of TF and PF-related TFS. 

HAITI

(Statement from June 2024)

Since June 2021, when Haiti made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Haiti has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including improving the FIU’s access to and use of a wide range of information in its financial intelligence products through the adoption of a new organic law. The FATF recognises the political commitment expressed at a high level and the efforts demonstrated by Haiti to advance its commitments in the midst of the challenging social, economic and security situation within the country. Haiti should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) completing its ML/TF risk assessment process and disseminating the findings; (2) implementing risk-based AML/CFT supervision for all financial institutions and DNFBPs deemed to constitute a higher ML/TF risk; (3) ensuring basic and beneficial ownership information are maintained and accessible in a timely manner; (4) ensuring the FIU has adequate resources and processes to produce and disseminate operational and strategic analysis to competent authorities for combatting ML and TF; (4) demonstrating authorities are identifying, investigating and prosecuting ML cases in a manner consistent with Haiti’s risk profile; (5) demonstrating an increase of identification, tracing and recovery of proceeds of crimes; (6) addressing the technical deficiencies in its targeted financial sanctions regime; and (7) conducting appropriate risk-based monitoring of NPOs vulnerable to TF abuse without disrupting or discouraging legitimate NPO activities.

The FATF notes Haiti’s continued progress across its action plan, however all deadlines are expired and work remains. The FATF encourages Haiti to continue to implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies.

KENYA

Since February 2024, when Kenya made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Kenya has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by completing a TF risk assessment and by bringing its TFS framework related to proliferation financing into compliance. Kenya should continue to work to implement its FATF action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by:(1) presenting the results of the NRA and other risk assessments in a consistent manner to competent authorities and the private sector and updating the national AML/CFT strategies; (2) improving risk-based AML/CFT supervision of FIs and DNFBPs and adopting a legal framework for the licensing and supervision of VASPs; (3) enhancing the understanding of preventive measures by FIs and DNFBPs, including to increase STR filing and implement TFS without delay; (4) designating an authority for the regulation of trusts and collection of accurate and up-to-date beneficial ownership information and implementing remedial actions for breaches of compliance with transparency requirements for legal persons and arrangements; (5) improving the use and quality of financial intelligence products; (6) increasing ML and TF investigations and prosecutions in line with risks; (7) bringing the TFS framework in compliance with R.6 and ensure its effective implementation; and (8) revising the framework for NPO regulation and oversight to ensure that mitigating measures are risk-based and do not disrupt or discourage legitimate NPO activity. 

LAO PDR

In February 2025, Lao PDR made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its MER in August 2023, Lao PDR has made progress on some of the MER’s recommended actions including increasing FIU resources and eliminating bearer shares. Lao PDR will continue to work with the FATF to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) enhancing its understanding of ML/TF risks; (2) improving risk-based supervision of casinos, banks and reporting entities in SEZs, including fit and proper checks; (3) enhancing the quality and quantity of financial intelligence analysis and spontaneous dissemination to law enforcement agencies; (4) ensuring law enforcement agencies receive training and guidance on money laundering; (5) demonstrating an increase in ML investigations and prosecutions in line with Lao PDR’s risk profile, with an emphasis on crimes with a transnational element that require international cooperation; (6) developing a national confiscation policy consistent with its ML/TF risks; (7) demonstrating that relevant competent authorities are taking measures to identify,  seize and, where applicable, confiscate proceeds and instrumentalities of crime in line with the risk profile; (8) monitoring FIs’ and DNFBPs’ compliance with TFS PF obligations; and (9) addressing technical compliance deficiencies in Recommendations 5, 6, 7 and 10. 

LEBANON

(Statement from October 2024)

In October 2024, Lebanon made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime in spite of the challenging social, economic and security situation within the country. Since the adoption of its MER in May 2023, Lebanon has made progress on several of the MER’s recommended actions and has applied measures to its financial sector, including through issuing a circular for banks and financial institutions to establish a department dedicated to combating bribery and corruption related crimes and guidance on politically exposed persons, while taking measures against unlicensed financial activity.

Lebanon will continue to work with the FATF to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) conducting assessments of specific terrorist financing and money laundering risks identified in the MER and ensuring that policies and measures are in place to mitigate these risks; (2) enhancing mechanisms to ensure the timely and effective execution of requests for mutual legal assistance, extradition and asset recovery; (3) enhancing DNFBPs’ risk understanding and applying effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for breaches of AML/CFT obligations; (4) ensuring beneficial ownership information is up-to-date and that there are adequate sanctions and risk-mitigating in place for legal persons; (5) enhancing competent authorities’ use of products of the FIU and financial intelligence; (6) demonstrating a sustained increase in investigations, prosecutions and court rulings for types of ML in line with the risk; (7) improving its approach to asset recovery and identifying and seizing illicit cross-border movements of currency and precious metals and stones; (8) pursuing TF investigations and sharing information with foreign partners related to investigations of TF as called for in the MER; (9) enhancing the implementation of targeted financial sanctions without delay, particularly at DNFBPs and certain non-banking financial institutions; and (10) undertaking targeted and risk-based monitoring of high-risk NPOs, without disrupting or discouraging legitimate NPO activities. 

MALI

In October 2021, Mali made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. At its February 2025 plenary, the FATF made the initial determination that Mali has substantially completed its action plan and warrants an on-site assessment to verify that the implementation of AML/CFT reforms has begun and is being sustained, and that the necessary political commitment remains in place to sustain implementation in the future.

Mali has made key reforms by: (1) disseminating the results of the NRA to all relevant stakeholders including by conducting awareness raising activities with the highest risk sectors; (2) developing a risk based approach for the AML/CFT supervision of all FIs and higher risk DNFBPs and demonstrating effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for noncompliance; (3) conducting a comprehensive assessment of ML/TF risks associated with all types of legal persons; (4) increasing the capacity of the FIU and the LEAs and enhancing their cooperation on the use of financial intelligence; (5) ensuring relevant competent authorities are involved in investigation and prosecution of ML; (6) strengthening the capacities of relevant authorities responsible for investigation and prosecution of TF cases; (7) establishing a legal framework and procedures to implement targeted financial sanctions; and (8) implementing a risk-based approach for supervision of the NPO sector to prevent abuse for TF purposes. 

MONACO

(Statement from June 2024)

In June 2024, Monaco made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MONEYVAL to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its mutual evaluation report (MER) in December 2022, Monaco has made significant progress on several of the MER’s recommended actions including by establishing a new combined financial intelligence unit (FIU) and AML/CFT supervisor, strengthening its approach to detecting and investigating terrorism financing, implementing targeted financial sanctions and risk-based supervision of non-profit organisations. Monaco will continue to work with FATF to implement its action plan by: (1) strengthening the understanding of risk in relation to money laundering and income tax fraud committed abroad; (2) demonstrating a sustained increase in outbound requests to identify and seek the seizure of criminal assets abroad (3) enhancing the application of sanctions for AML/CFT breaches and breaches of basic and beneficial ownership requirements; (4) completing its resourcing program for its FIU and strengthen the quality and timeliness of STR reporting; (5) enhancing judicial efficiency, including through increasing resources of investigative judges and prosecutors and the application of effective, dissuasive and proportionate sanctions for money laundering; and (6) increasing the seizure of property suspected to derive from criminal activities. 

MOZAMBIQUE

Since October 2022, when Mozambique made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Mozambique has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by implementing a risk-based supervision plan along with effective and proportionate sanctions, increasing financial intelligence sent to authorities and demonstrating the ability to identify TF cases. Mozambique should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) carrying out a risk assessment for NPOs in line with the FATF Standards and using it as a basis to develop an outreach plan. 

NAMIBIA

Since February 2024, when Namibia made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Namibia has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by strengthening FIU resources dedicated to both its supervision responsibilities and operational and strategic analysis, and increasing the LEAs’ financial and human resources dedicated to TF. Namibia should continue working on implementing its FATF action plan to address strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) strengthening its AML/CFT risk based supervision through conducting offsite and onsite inspections informed by supervisory risk assessment tools and applying effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for breaches of AML/CFT obligations; (2) enhancing preventive measures through inspections and outreach to ensure that FIs and DNFBPs apply enhanced due diligence measures as well as TFS obligations related to TF and PF without delay; (3) increasing the filing of beneficial ownership information of legal persons and arrangements, and applying remedial actions and/or effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions against breaches of compliance with beneficial ownership obligations; (4) improving the cooperation between the FIU and LEAs to enhance the use and integration of financial intelligence in investigations; (5) enhancing the operational capabilities of authorities involved in ML investigations and prosecutions by providing them with adequate resources and targeted trainings; (6) demonstrating the LEAs’ capabilities to effectively investigate and prosecute ML/TF cases. 

NEPAL 

In February 2025, Nepal made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its MER in August 2023, Nepal has made progress on some of the MER’s recommended actions including streamlining MLA requests and increasing the capabilities of the FIU. Nepal will continue to work with the FATF to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) improving its understanding of key ML/TF risks; (2) improving risk-based supervision of commercial banks, higher risk cooperatives, casinos, DPMS and real estate sector; (3) demonstrating identification and sanctioning of materially significant illegal MVTS/hundi providers, without hindering financial inclusion; (4) increasing capacity and coordination of competent authorities to conduct ML investigations; (5) demonstrating an increase in ML investigations and prosecutions; (6) demonstrating measures to identify, trace, restrain, seize and, where applicable, confiscate proceeds and instrumentalities of crime in line with the risk profile; (7) addressing technical compliance deficiencies in its targeted financial sanctions regime for TF and PF. 

NIGERIA

Since February 2023, when Nigeria made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Nigeria has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by improving AML/CFT risk-based supervision of FIs and DNFBPs, ensuring that competent authorities have timely access to accurate and up-to-date beneficial ownership information on legal persons and demonstrating a sustained increase in ML and TF investigations and prosecutions in line with the country’s risk profile.. Nigeria should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) enhancing implementation of preventive measures for high-risk sectors; and (2) proactively detecting violations of currency declaration obligations and applying appropriate sanctions. 

SOUTH AFRICA

Since February 2023, when South Africa made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, South Africa has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime including by demonstrating that all supervisors apply effective, proportionate, and effective sanctions, ensuring competent authorities have timely access to accurate and up to date BO information on legal persons and arrangements and applying sanctions for breaches of violation by legal persons to beneficial ownership obligations. South Africa should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its remaining strategic deficiency on demonstrating a sustained increase in investigations and prosecutions of serious and complex money laundering and the full range of TF activities in line with its risk profile. 

SOUTH SUDAN

Since June 2021, when South Sudan made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, South Sudan has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by finalising its comprehensive review of the AML/CFT Act (2012) to comply with the FATF Standards. South Sudan should continue to work to implement its action plan, including by: ; (1) fully implementing the 1988 Vienna Convention, the 2000 Palermo Convention, and the 1999 Terrorist Financing Convention; (2) ensuring that competent authorities are suitably structured and capacitated to implement a risk-based approach to AML/CFT supervision for financial institutions; (3) developing a comprehensive legal framework to collect and verify the accuracy of beneficial ownership information for legal persons; (4) finalising the operationalisation of a fully functioning and independent FIU; (5) establishing and implementing the legal and institutional framework to implement targeted financial sanctions in compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions on terrorism and WMD proliferation financing; and (6) commencing implementation of targeted risk-based supervision/monitoring of NPOs at risk of TF abuse

The FATF notes South Sudan’s limited progress across its action plan with all deadlines now expired and work remaining. The FATF again encourages South Sudan to continue to implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies as soon as possible and demonstrate strong political and institutional commitment to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, particularly in supporting the lead AML/CFT agency in coordinating national AML/CFT efforts.

SYRIA

(Statement from February 2023)

Since February 2010, when Syria made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Syria has made progress to improve its AML/CFT regime. In June 2014, the FATF determined that Syria had substantially addressed its action plan at a technical level, including by criminalising terrorist financing and establishing procedures for freezing terrorist assets. While the FATF determined that Syria has completed its agreed action plan, due to the security situation, the FATF has been unable to conduct an on-site visit to confirm whether the process of implementing the required reforms and actions has begun and is being sustained. The FATF will continue to monitor the situation, and will conduct an on-site visit at the earliest possible date. 

TANZANIA

In October 2022, Tanzania made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. At its February 2025 plenary, the FATF made the initial determination that Tanzania has substantially completed its action plan and warrants an on-site assessment to verify that the implementation of AML/CFT reforms has begun and is being sustained, and that the necessary political commitment remains in place to sustain implementation in the future.

Tanzania has made the following key reforms: (1) improving risk-based supervision of FIs and DNFBPs, including by conducting inspections on a risk-sensitive basis and applying effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions for non-compliance; (2) demonstrating authorities’ capability to effectively conduct a range of investigations and prosecutions of ML in line with the country’s risk profile; (3) demonstrating that LEAs are taking measures to identify, trace, seize, and confiscate proceeds and instrumentalities of crime; (4) conducting a comprehensive TF Risk Assessment and begin implementing a comprehensive national CFT strategy as well as demonstrating capability to conduct TF investigations and pursue prosecutions in line with the country’s risk profile; (5) increasing awareness of the private sector and competent authorities on TF and PF-related TFS; and (6) carrying out the TF risk assessment for NPOs in line with the FATF Standards and using it as a basis to develop an outreach plan.

VENEZUELA

In June 2024, Venezuela made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Venezuela should continue working on implementing its FATF action plan to address its strategic deficiencies by: (1) strengthening its understanding of ML/TF risks, including in relation to TF and legal persons and arrangements; (2) ensuring the full range of financial institutions and DNFBPs are subject to AML/CFT measures and risk-based supervision; (3) ensuring adequate, accurate and up-to-date beneficial ownership information is accessible in a timely manner; (4) enhancing the resources of the FIU and improving competent authorities’ use of financial intelligence; (5) enhancing the investigation and prosecution of ML and TF; (6) ensuring measures to prevent the abuse of NPOs for TF are targeted, proportionate, and risk-based and do not disrupt or discourage legitimate activities within the NPO sector; and (7) implementing TF-and PF-related targeted financial sanctions without delay.

VIETNAM

Since June 2023, when Vietnam made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Vietnam has made limited progress. The FATF strongly encourages Vietnam to coordinate internally to demonstrate progress on its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) increasing risk understanding, domestic co-ordination and co-operation to combat ML/TF; (2) enhancing international co-operation; (3) implementing effective risk-based supervision for FIs and DNFBPs; (4) taking action to regulate virtual assets and virtual asset service providers; (5) addressing technical compliance deficiencies, including with respect to the ML offence, targeted financial sanctions, customer due diligence and suspicious transaction reporting; (6) conducing outreach activities with the private sector; (7) establishing a regime that provides competent authorities with adequate, accurate and up-to-date information on beneficial ownership; (8) ensuring the independence of the FIU and enhancing the quality and quantity of financial intelligence analysis and disseminations; (9) prioritizing parallel financial investigations and demonstrating an increase in the number of ML investigations and prosecutions undertaken; and (10) demonstrating that there is monitoring of FIs and DNFBPs for compliance with PF TFS obligations and that there is co-operation and co-ordination between authorities to prevent PF TFS from being evaded. 

YEMEN

(Statement from February 2023)

Since February 2010, when Yemen made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Yemen has made progress to improve its AML/CFT regime. In June 2014, the FATF determined that Yemen had substantially addressed its action plan at a technical level, including by: (1) adequately criminalising money laundering and terrorist financing; (2) establishing procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets; (3) improving its customer due diligence and suspicious transaction reporting requirements; (4) issuing guidance; (5) developing the monitoring and supervisory capacity of the financial sector supervisory authorities and the financial intelligence unit; and (6) establishing a fully operational and effectively functioning financial intelligence unit. While the FATF determined that Yemen has completed its agreed action plan, due to the security situation, the FATF has been unable to conduct an on-site visit to confirm whether the process of implementing the required reforms and actions has begun and is being sustained. The FATF will continue to monitor the situation, and conduct an on-site visit at the earliest possible date. 

JURISDICTIONS NO LONGER SUBJECT TO INCREASED MONITORING BY THE FATF

PHILIPPINES

The FATF welcomes the Philippines’ significant progress in improving its AML/CFT regime. The Philippines strengthened the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime to meet the commitments in its action plan regarding the strategic deficiencies that the FATF identified in June 2021 by (1) demonstrating that effective risk-based supervision of DNFBPs is occurring; (2) demonstrating that supervisors are using AML/CFT controls to mitigate risks associated with casino junkets; (3) implementing the new registration requirements for MVTS and applying sanctions to unregistered and illegal remittance operators; (4) enhancing and streamlining LEA access to BO information and taking steps to ensure that BO information is accurate and up-to-date; (5) demonstrating an increase in the use of financial intelligence and an increase in ML investigations and prosecutions in line with risk; (6) demonstrating an increase in the identification, investigation and prosecution of TF cases; (7) demonstrating that appropriate measures are taken with respect to the NPO sector (including unregistered NPOs) without disrupting legitimate NPO activity; (8) enhancing the effectiveness of the targeted financial sanctions framework for both TF and PF; and (9) applying cross-border measures in all main international sea/airports, in line with the risk.

The Philippines should continue to work with APG to sustain its improvements in its AML/CFT system. The FATF encourages the Philippines to continue its work in ensuring that its CFT measures are appropriately applied, particularly the identification and prosecution of TF cases, and are neither discouraging nor disrupting legitimate NPO activity.

To obtain access to the full publication by the FATF click on the link below.

https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-february-2025.html 

High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action - June 2024 

High-risk jurisdictions have significant strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and financing of proliferation. For all countries identified as high-risk, the FATF calls on all members and urges all jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence, and, in the most serious cases, countries are called upon to apply counter-measures to protect the international financial system from the money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing (ML/TF/PF) risks emanating from the country. This list is often externally referred to as the “black list”. Since February 2020, in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, the FATF has paused the review process for Iran and DPRK, given that they are already subject to the FATF’s call for countermeasures. Iran reported in January 2024 with no material changes in the status of its action plan.

Given heightened proliferation financing risks, the FATF reiterates its call to apply countermeasures on these high-risk jurisdictions.

Jurisdictions subject to a FATF call on its members and other jurisdictions to apply countermeasures

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)

Building upon the FATF statements over the past decade, the FATF remains concerned by the DPRK’s continued failure to address the significant deficiencies in its anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime and the serious threats posed by the DPRK’s illicit activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and its financing. 

The FATF has continually reiterated since 2011 the need for all countries to robustly implement the targeted financial sanctions in accordance with UNSC Resolutions and apply the following countermeasures to protect their financial systems from the money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing threat emanating from DPRK: 

• Terminate correspondent relationships with DPRK banks;

• Close any subsidiaries or branches of DPRK banks in their countries; and

• Limit business relationships & financial transactions with DPRK persons. 

Despite these calls, DPRK has increased connectivity with the international financial system, which raises proliferation financing (PF) risks, as the FATF noted in February 2024. This requires greater vigilance and renewed implementation and enforcement of these countermeasures against the DPRK. As set out in UNSCR 2270, DPRK frequently uses front companies, shell companies, joint ventures and complex, opaque ownership structures for the purpose of violating sanctions. As such, FATF encourages its members and all countries to apply enhanced due diligence to the DPRK and its ability to facilitate transactions on its behalf. 

The FATF also urges countries to adequately assess and account for the increased proliferation financing risk with the greater financial connectivity reported, particularly since the next round of assessments requires countries to adequately assess PF risks under Recommendation 1 and Immediate Outcome 11. The ability to obtain reliable and credible information to support the assessment of PF risks relating to the DPRK is hampered by the recent termination of the 1718 Committee Panel of Experts mandate. Thus, the FATF will monitor the measures to comply with DPRK targeted financial sanctions and the implementation of countermeasures against DPRK. 

Iran

In June 2016, Iran committed to address its strategic deficiencies. Iran’s action plan expired in January 2018. In February 2020, the FATF noted Iran has not completed the action plan.[1]

In October 2019, the FATF called upon its members and urged all jurisdictions to: require increased supervisory examination for branches and subsidiaries of financial institutions based in Iran; introduce enhanced relevant reporting mechanisms or systematic reporting of financial transactions; and require increased external audit requirements for financial groups with respect to any of their branches and subsidiaries located in Iran.

Now, given Iran’s failure to enact the Palermo and Terrorist Financing Conventions in line with the FATF Standards, the FATF fully lifts the suspension of countermeasures and calls on its members and urges all jurisdictions to apply effective countermeasures, in line with Recommendation 19.[2]

Iran will remain on the FATF statement on High Risk Jurisdictions Subject to a Call for Action until the full Action Plan has been completed. If Iran ratifies the Palermo and Terrorist Financing Conventions, in line with the FATF standards, the FATF will decide on next steps, including whether to suspend countermeasures. Until Iran implements the measures required to address the deficiencies identified with respect to countering terrorism-financing in the Action Plan, the FATF will remain concerned with the terrorist financing risk emanating from Iran and the threat this poses to the international financial system.

[1] In June 2016, the FATF welcomed Iran’s high-level political commitment to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, and its decision to seek technical assistance in the implementation of the Action Plan. Since 2016, Iran established a cash declaration regime, enacted amendments to its Counter-Terrorist Financing Act and its Anti-Money Laundering Act, and adopted an AML by-law.

In February 2020, the FATF noted that there are still items not completed and Iran should fully address: (1) adequately criminalizing terrorist financing, including by removing the exemption for designated groups “attempting to end foreign occupation, colonialism and racism”; (2) identifying and freezing terrorist assets in line with the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions; (3) ensuring an adequate and enforceable customer due diligence regime; (4) demonstrating how authorities are identifying and sanctioning unlicensed money/value transfer service providers; (5) ratifying and implementing the Palermo and TF Conventions and clarifying the capability to provide mutual legal assistance; and (6) ensuring that financial institutions verify that wire transfers contain complete originator and beneficiary information.

[2] Countries should be able to apply appropriate countermeasures when called upon to do so by the FATF. Countries should also be able to apply countermeasures independently of any call by the FATF to do so. Such countermeasures should be effective and proportionate to the risks.

The Interpretative Note to Recommendation 19 specifies examples of the countermeasures that could be undertaken by countries.

Jurisdiction subject to a FATF call on its members and other jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence measures proportionate to the risks arising from the jurisdiction

Myanmar

In February 2020, Myanmar committed to address its strategic deficiencies. Myanmar’s action plan expired in September 2021.

In October 2022, given the continued lack of progress and the majority of its action items still not addressed after a year beyond the action plan deadline, the FATF decided that further action was necessary in line with its procedures and FATF calls on its members and other jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence measures proportionate to the risk arising from Myanmar. The FATF requires that as part of enhanced due diligence, financial institutions should increase the degree and nature of monitoring of the business relationship, in order to determine whether those transactions or activities appear unusual or suspicious. When applying enhanced due diligence measures, countries should ensure that flows of funds for humanitarian assistance, legitimate NPO activity and remittances are not disrupted. If no further progress is made by October 2024, the FATF will consider countermeasures.

Myanmar’s overall progress continues to be slow. Myanmar should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address these deficiencies, including by: (1) demonstrating an improved understanding of ML risks in key areas; (2) demonstrating that hundi operators are registered and supervised; (3) demonstrating enhanced use of financial intelligence in law enforcement authorities (LEAs) investigations, and increasing operational analysis and disseminations by the financial intelligence unit (FIU); (4) ensuring that ML is investigated/prosecuted in line with risks; (5) demonstrating investigation of transnational ML cases with international cooperation; (6) demonstrating an increase in the freezing/seizing and confiscation of criminal proceeds, instrumentalities, and/or property of equivalent value; (7) managing seized assets to preserve the value of seized goods until confiscation; and (8) addressing technical compliance deficiencies related to R.7 to ensure effective implementation of targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation financing.

The FATF urges Myanmar to work to fully address its AML/CFT deficiencies, including to demonstrate that its monitoring and supervision of money or value transfer services (MVTS) is based on documented and sound understanding of ML/TF risks to mitigate undue scrutiny of legitimate financial flows.

Myanmar will remain on the list of countries subject to a call for action until its full action plan is completed. 

https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/Call-for-action-june-2024.html 

Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring

Jurisdictions under increased monitoring are actively working with the FATF to address strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing. When the FATF places a jurisdiction under increased monitoring, it means the country has committed to resolve swiftly the identified strategic deficiencies within agreed timeframes and is subject to increased monitoring. This list is often externally referred to as the “grey list”.

The FATF and FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs) continue to work with the jurisdictions below as they report on the progress achieved in addressing their strategic deficiencies. The FATF calls on these jurisdictions to complete their action plans expeditiously and within the agreed timeframes. The FATF welcomes their commitment and will closely monitor their progress. The FATF does not call for the application of enhanced due diligence measures to be applied to these jurisdictions. The FATF Standards do not envisage de-risking, or cutting-off entire classes of customers, but call for the application of a risk-based approach. Therefore, the FATF encourages its members and all jurisdictions to take into account the information presented below in their risk analysis.

The FATF identifies additional jurisdictions, on an on-going basis, that have strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing. A number of jurisdictions have not yet been reviewed by the FATF or their FSRBs, but will be in due course. 

The FATF provides some flexibility to jurisdictions not facing immediate deadlines to report progress on a voluntary basis. The following countries had their progress reviewed by the FATF since February 2024: Bulgaria; Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Croatia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Jamaica, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Philippines, Senegal, South Africa, South Sudan, Tanzania, Türkiye, and Vietnam. For these countries, updated statements are provided below. Kenya, Namibia, Syria and Yemen chose to defer reporting; thus, the statements issued previously for those jurisdictions are included below, but it may not necessarily reflect the most recent status of the jurisdictions’ AML/CFT regimes. Following review, the FATF now also identifies Monaco and Venezuela.

BULGARIA

Since October 2023, when Bulgaria made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MONEYVAL to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Bulgaria has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by adopting an action plan to implement its national AML/CFT Strategy, establishing market entry controls for VASPs and postal money operators, communicating UN changes to targeted financial sanctions (TFS) and completing the implementation of a system to ensure prioritisation of STRs. Bulgaria should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) demonstrating initial implementation of its national action plan for its AML/CFT Strategy; (2) addressing the remaining technical compliance deficiencies; (3) demonstrating initial implementation of risk-based supervision for postal money operators, currency exchange providers and real estate agents; (4) ensuring that the beneficial ownership information held in the Register is accurate and up-to-date; (5) improving investigations and prosecutions of different types of money laundering in line with risks, including high-scale corruption and organised crime; (6) ensuring that confiscation is pursued as a policy objective; (7) ensuring the ability to conduct parallel financial investigations in all terrorism investigations; (8) addressing gaps in the PF TFS frameworks; and (9) identifying the subset of non-profit organisations (NPOs) most vulnerable to TF abuse and demonstrating initial implementation of risk-based monitoring to prevent abuse for TF purposes.

BURKINA FASO

Since February 2021, when Burkina Faso made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Burkina Faso has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by implementing a case management system for mutual legal assistance requests, developing a software for the management of STRs and establishing procedures for the implementation of the cross-border declaration system. Burkina Faso should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) strengthening resource capacities of all AML/CFT supervisory authorities and implementing risk-based supervision; (2) maintaining comprehensive and updated basic and beneficial ownership information of legal persons and strengthening the system of sanctions for violations of transparency obligations; and (3) implementing an effective TFS regime related to TF and PF as well as risk-based monitoring and supervision of NPOs.

The FATF notes Burkina Faso’s continued progress across its action plan, however all deadlines have expired and work remains. The FATF urges Burkina Faso to swiftly implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies as soon as possible as all deadlines expired in December 2022.

CAMEROON

In June 2023, Cameroon made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GABAC to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Cameroon should continue working on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by work to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) aligning AML/CFT national strategies and policies with the findings of the NRA and monitoring their implementation, and demonstrating AML/CFT cooperation and coordination between competent authorities; (2) ensuring risk-based prioritisation of incoming international cooperation requests in line with risks and responding in an effective manner; (3) enhancing risk-based supervision of banks and implementing effective risk-based supervision for non-bank FIs and DNFBPs, and conducting appropriate outreach to high-risk FIs and DNFBPs; (4) maintaining and ensuring timely access by competent authorities to adequate and up to date beneficial ownership information on legal persons, and establishing a sanctions regime for violations of transparency obligations applicable to legal persons; (5) enhancing secure information exchange between the FIU, reporting entities and competent authorities and demonstrating an increase in dissemination of intelligence reports to support operational needs of competent authorities; (6) demonstrating that authorities are able to conduct a range of ML investigations, and prosecute ML in line with risks; (7) implementing policies and procedures for seizing and confiscating proceeds and instrumentalities of crime and managing frozen, seized and confiscated property, and prioritising seizure and confiscation of assets at the border; (8) demonstrating that TF investigations and prosecutions are pursued in line with risk; and (9) demonstrating effective implementation of TF and PF TFS regimes and implementing a risk-based approach to NPOs without disrupting legitimate NPO activities. 

CROATIA

Since June 2023, when Croatia made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MONEYVAL to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Croatia has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including demonstrating the ability to systematically detect and where relevant investigate TF in line with its risk profile, addressing technical compliances deficiencies in relation to Recommendations 6 and 7, providing guidance to reporting entities on TFS, and identifying the subset of NPOs most vulnerable to TF abuse. Croatia should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) increasing FIU human resources and improving analytical capabilities; (2) continuing to improve law enforcement authorities’ (LEAs’) detection, investigation and prosecution of different types of ML, including ML involving a foreign predicate offences and the misuse of legal persons; (3) demonstrating a sustained increase in the application of provisional measures in securing direct/indirect proceeds, as well as foreign proceeds subject to confiscation; (4) demonstrating immediate communication of changes in UN TFS regimes to reporting entities and (5) providing targeted outreach to NPOs and to the donor community on potential vulnerabilities of NPOs to TF abuse.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Since October 2022, when the DRC made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GABAC to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, the DRC has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by disseminating the results of their NRA and providing financial and human resources to FI and DNFBP supervisors. The DRC should continue to work to implement its FATF action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) developing and implementing a risk-based supervision plan; (2) building the capacity of the FIU to conduct operational and strategic analysis; (3) strengthening the capabilities of authorities involved in the investigation and prosecution of ML and TF; and (4) demonstrating effective implementation of TF and PF-related TFS. 

HAITI

Since June 2021, when Haiti made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Haiti has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including improving the FIU’s access to and use of a wide range of information in its financial intelligence products through the adoption of a new organic law. The FATF recognises the political commitment expressed at a high level and the efforts demonstrated by Haiti to advance its commitments in the midst of the challenging social, economic and security situation within the country. Haiti should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) completing its ML/TF risk assessment process and disseminating the findings; (2) implementing risk-based AML/CFT supervision for all financial institutions and DNFBPs deemed to constitute a higher ML/TF risk; (3) ensuring basic and beneficial ownership information are maintained and accessible in a timely manner; (4) ensuring the FIU has adequate resources and processes to produce and disseminate operational and strategic analysis to competent authorities for combatting ML and TF; (4) demonstrating authorities are identifying, investigating and prosecuting ML cases in a manner consistent with Haiti’s risk profile; (5) demonstrating an increase of identification, tracing and recovery of proceeds of crimes; (6) addressing the technical deficiencies in its targeted financial sanctions regime; and (7) conducting appropriate risk-based monitoring of NPOs vulnerable to TF abuse without disrupting or discouraging legitimate NPO activities.

The FATF notes Haiti’s continued progress across its action plan, however all deadlines are expired and work remains. The FATF encourages Haiti to continue to implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies.

KENYA

(Statement from February 2024)

In February 2024, Kenya made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its MER in September 2022, Kenya has made progress on some of the MER’s recommended actions including by making amendments to its AML/CFT legislation to bring its framework in closer compliance with the FATF recommendations and establishing a case management system to better manage its international cooperation requests. Kenya will work to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) completing a TF risk assessment and presenting the results of the NRA and other risk assessments in a consistent manner to competent authorities and the private sector and updating the national AML/CFT strategies; (2) improving risk-based AML/CFT supervision of FIs and DNFBPs and adopting a legal framework for the licensing and supervision of VASPs; (3) enhancing the understanding of preventive measures by FIs and DNFBPs, including to increase STR filing and implement TFS without delay; (4) designating an authority for the regulation of trusts and collection of accurate and up-to-date beneficial ownership information and implementing remedial actions for breaches of compliance with transparency requirements for legal persons and arrangements; (5) improving the use and quality of financial intelligence products; (6) increasing ML and TF investigations and prosecutions in line with risks; (7) bringing the TFS framework in compliance with R.6 and R.7 and ensure its effective implementation; and (8) revising the framework for NPO regulation and oversight to ensure that mitigating measures are risk-based and do not disrupt or discourage legitimate NPO activity.  

MALI

Since October 2021, when Mali made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Mali has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by establishing a framework for the monitoring of NPOs at risk of abuse for TF purposes and implementing measures commensurate with the risk. Mali should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) demonstrating timely access to accurate beneficial ownership information; (2) addressing pending technical compliance deficiencies with R.5 and 20, and identifying and investigating TF activities in line with the country’s risk profile; and (3) implementing TFS related to TF and PF.

The FATF notes Mali’s continued progress across its action plan, however all deadlines have now expired and work remains. The FATF encourages Mali to continue to implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies as soon as possible.

MONACO

In June 2024, Monaco made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MONEYVAL to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its mutual evaluation report (MER) in December 2022, Monaco has made significant progress on several of the MER’s recommended actions including by establishing a new combined financial intelligence unit (FIU) and AML/CFT supervisor, strengthening its approach to detecting and investigating terrorism financing, implementing targeted financial sanctions and risk-based supervision of non-profit organisations. Monaco will continue to work with FATF to implement its action plan by: (1) strengthening the understanding of risk in relation to money laundering and income tax fraud committed abroad; (2) demonstrating a sustained increase in outbound requests to identify and seek the seizure of criminal assets abroad (3) enhancing the application of sanctions for AML/CFT breaches and breaches of basic and beneficial ownership requirements; (4) completing its resourcing program for its FIU and strengthen the quality and timeliness of STR reporting; (5) enhancing judicial efficiency, including through increasing resources of investigative judges and prosecutors and the application of effective, dissuasive and proportionate sanctions for money laundering; and (6) increasing the seizure of property suspected to derive from criminal activities. 

MOZAMBIQUE

Since October 2022, when Mozambique made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Mozambique has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by commencing the collection of beneficial ownership information, developing a CFT strategy and enhancing the capacity of CFT investigative and prosecutorial authorities, and addressing deficiencies in the TFS framework. Mozambique should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) providing adequate financial and human resources to supervisors, developing and implementing a risk-based supervision plan; (2) increasing the human resources of the FIU as well as increasing financial intelligence sent to authorities; (3) demonstrating LEAs’ capability to effectively investigate a range of ML offences using financial intelligence; (4) conducting training for FIU, supervisors, and LEAs on the new legal and institutional framework for implementing TFS; and (6) carrying out the TF risk assessment for NPOs in line with the FATF Standards and using it as a basis to develop an outreach plan.

NAMIBIA

(Statement from February 2024)

In February 2024, Namibia made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its MER in September 2022, Namibia has made progress on its MER’s recommended actions to ensure a common understanding of ML/TF/PF risk across key stakeholders as well as improve international cooperation. Namibia will work to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) strengthening its AML/CFT risk based supervision through enhancing the human and resource capacities, conducting offsite and onsite inspections informed by supervisory risk assessment tools and applying effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for breaches of AML/CFT obligations; (2) enhancing preventive measures through inspections and outreach to ensure that FIs and DNFBPs apply enhanced due diligence measures as well as TFS obligations related to TF and PF without delay; (3) increasing the filing of beneficial ownership information of legal persons and arrangements, and applying remedial actions and/or effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions against breaches of compliance with beneficial ownership obligations; (4) providing the FIU with adequate human and financial resources, as well as trainings, to improve operational and strategic analysis; (5) improving the cooperation between the FIU and LEAs to enhance the use and integration of financial intelligence in investigations; (6) enhancing the operational capabilities of authorities involved in ML and TF investigations and prosecutions by providing them with adequate resources and targeted trainings; (7) demonstrating the LEAs’ capabilities to effectively investigate and prosecute ML/TF cases; and (8) approving the amended National Counter Terrorism Strategy.

NIGERIA

Since February 2023, when Nigeria made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Nigeria has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by completing its residual ML/TF risk assessments and disseminating the results, and increasing the dissemination of financial intelligence by the FIU and its use by LEA in line with the country’s risk profile. Nigeria should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) enhancing formal and informal international cooperation in line with ML/TF risks; (2) improving AML/CFT risk-based supervision of FIs and DNFBPs and enhancing implementation of preventive measures for high-risk sectors; (3) ensuring that competent authorities have timely access to accurate and up-to-date beneficial ownership information on legal persons and applying sanctions for breaches of obligations; (5) demonstrating a sustained increase in ML investigations and prosecutions in line with ML risks; (6) proactively detecting violations of currency declaration obligations and apply appropriate sanctions; (7) demonstrating sustained increase in investigations and prosecutions of different types of TF activities in line with risk and enhancing interagency cooperation on TF investigations; and (8) implementing risk-based monitoring for the subset of NPOs at risk of TF abuse without disrupting or discouraging legitimate NPO activities.

PHILIPPINES

Since June 2021, when the Philippines made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, the Philippines has taken significant steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by demonstrating an increase in ML investigations and prosecutions in line with risk; enforcement of beneficial ownership transparency obligations and law enforcement access to those beneficial ownership data records; and that risk-based supervision of DNFBPs is occurring. The Philippines should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) demonstrating that supervisors are using AML/CFT controls to mitigate risks associated with casino junkets; (2) applying cross-border measures to all main sea/airports including detection of false declarations of currency and confiscation action in line with risk; and (3) demonstrating an increase in the prosecution of TF cases in line with risk.

The FATF urges the Philippines to swiftly implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies as soon as possible as all deadlines expired in January 2023.

SENEGAL

In February 2021, Senegal made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. At its June 2024 plenary, the FATF made the initial determination that Senegal has substantially completed its action plan and warrant an on-site assessment to verify that the implementation of AML/CFT reforms has begun and is being sustained, and that the necessary political commitment remains in place to sustain implementation in the future.

Senegal has made the following key reforms including: (1) demonstrating consistent understanding of ML/TF risks across relevant authorities; (2) seeking international cooperation to facilitate ML/TF investigations and tracing of proceeds of crime located abroad, (3) demonstrating that FIs and DNFBPs are subject to adequate and effective risk-based supervision and sanction measures and that they improve compliance with AML/CFT obligations including by increasing STR reporting and establishing effective internal control mechanisms, (4) maintaining adequate, accurate and up-to-date basic and beneficial ownership information and ensuring its timely access by competent authorities, (5) increasing the capacity of the FIU staff to conduct analysis and increasing the dissemination of financial intelligence, (6) increasing the capacity of law enforcement authorities in the detection and investigation of ML and predicate offences in line with risk and maintaining statistics on cases investigated and prosecuted, (7) establishing policies and procedures for the identification and seizure of proceeds of crime and demonstrating the effective application of seizing and freezing powers of relevant competent authorities, (8) strengthening the law enforcement and prosecutorial authorities’ understanding of TF risks and CFT capacity and demonstrating that TF investigations are in line with Senegal’s risk profile, (9) implementing targeted financial sanction regime, and (10) implementing a risk-based monitoring regime for NPOs at risk of abuse for TF purposes.  

SOUTH AFRICA

Since February 2023, when South Africa made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, South Africa has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime including by implementing and updating its supervisory risk assessment tools for DNFBPs, updating its TF risk assessment, and enhancing the capacity of relevant CFT authorities. South Africa should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its remaining strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) demonstrating a sustained increase in outbound mutual legal assistance (MLA) requests that help facilitate ML/TF investigations and confiscations of different types of assets in line with its risk profile; (2) demonstrating that all AML/CFT supervisors apply effective, proportionate, and effective sanctions for non-compliance; (3) ensuring that competent authorities have timely access to accurate and up-to-date BO information on legal persons and arrangements and applying sanctions for breaches of violation by legal persons to beneficial ownership obligations; (5) demonstrate a sustained increase in investigations and prosecutions of serious and complex money laundering and the full range of TF activities in line with its risk profile; (6) enhancing its identification, seizure and confiscation of proceeds and instrumentalities of a wider range of predicate crimes, in line with its risk profile; (7) ensuring the effective implementation of targeted financial sanctions and demonstrating an effective mechanism to identify individuals and entities that meet the criteria for domestic designation.

SOUTH SUDAN

Since June 2021, when South Sudan made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, South Sudan has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by becoming a party to the relevant UN Conventions. South Sudan should continue to work to implement its action plan, including by: (1) completing its comprehensive review of the AML/CFT Act (2012), with the support of international partners, including technical assistance, to comply with the FATF Standards; (2) fully implementing the 1988 Vienna Convention, the 2000 Palermo Convention, and the 1999 Terrorist Financing Convention; (3) ensuring that competent authorities are suitably structured and capacitated to implement a risk-based approach to AML/CFT supervision for financial institutions; (4) developing a comprehensive legal framework to collect and verify the accuracy of beneficial ownership information for legal persons; (5) operationalising a fully functioning and independent FIU; (6) establishing and implementing the legal and institutional framework to implement targeted financial sanctions in compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions on terrorism and WMD proliferation financing; and (7) commencing implementation of targeted risk-based supervision/monitoring of NPOs at risk of TF abuse.

The FATF notes South Sudan’s limited progress across its action plan with all deadlines now expired and work remaining. The FATF again encourages South Sudan to continue to implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies as soon as possible and demonstrate strong political and institutional commitment to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, particularly in supporting the lead AML/CFT agency in coordinating national AML/CFT efforts.

SYRIA

(Statement from February 2023)

Since February 2010, when Syria made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Syria has made progress to improve its AML/CFT regime. In June 2014, the FATF determined that Syria had substantially addressed its action plan at a technical level, including by criminalising terrorist financing and establishing procedures for freezing terrorist assets. While the FATF determined that Syria has completed its agreed action plan, due to the security situation, the FATF has been unable to conduct an on-site visit to confirm whether the process of implementing the required reforms and actions has begun and is being sustained. The FATF will continue to monitor the situation, and will conduct an on-site visit at the earliest possible date.

TANZANIA

Since October 2022, when Tanzania made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Tanzania has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by finalising the risk-based supervision manuals for the real estate and DPMS sectors, demonstrating progress in the LEAs’ capacity to identify, trace, seize and, where feasible, confiscate proceeds and instrumentalities of crime, producing written guidance and trainings to enhance the private sector’s understanding of TF and PF TFS obligations, completing the revision of the national TF risk assessment and categorising the NPOs considered at high risk of TF abuse. Tanzania should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) improving the risk-based supervision of FIs and DNFBPs, including by conducting inspections on a risk-sensitive basis and applying effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions for non-compliance; (2) demonstrating authorities’ capability (including through improving the use of financial intelligence and availability of statistics) to effectively conduct a range of investigations and prosecutions of ML in line with the country’s risk profile; (3) developing and beginning to implement a comprehensive national CFT strategy as well as demonstrating a capability to conduct TF investigations and pursue prosecutions in line with the country’s risk profile; and (4) using the recently completed TF risk assessment for NPOs as a basis to develop an outreach and training plan.

VENEZUELA

In June 2024, Venezuela made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its MER in November 2022, Venezuela has made progress on some of the MER’s recommended actions including by updating its national risk assessment. Venezuela will work to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) strengthening its understanding of ML/TF risks, including in relation to TF and legal persons and arrangements; (2) ensuring the full range of financial institutions and DNFBPs are subject to AML/CFT measures and risk-based supervision; (3) ensuring adequate, accurate and up-to-date beneficial ownership information is accessible in a timely manner; (4) enhancing the resources of the FIU and improving competent authorities’ use of financial intelligence; (5) enhancing the investigation and prosecution of ML and TF; (6) ensuring measures to prevent the abuse of NPOs for TF are targeted, proportionate, and risk-based and do not disrupt or discourage legitimate activities within the NPO sector; and (7) implementing TF-and PF-related targeted financial sanctions without delay.  

VIETNAM

Since June 2023, when Vietnam made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Vietnam has made limited progress. The FATF strongly encourages Vietnam to coordinate internally to demonstrate further progress on its action plan and share relevant information with the FATF. Vietnam should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) increasing risk understanding, domestic co-ordination and co-operation to combat ML/TF; (2) enhancing international co-operation; (3) implementing effective risk-based supervision for FIs and DNFBPs; (4) taking action to regulate virtual assets and virtual asset service providers; (5) addressing technical compliance deficiencies, including with respect to the ML offence, targeted financial sanctions, customer due diligence and suspicious transaction reporting; (6) conducing outreach activities with the private sector; (7) establishing a regime that provides competent authorities with adequate, accurate and up-to-date information on beneficial ownership; (8) ensuring the independence of the FIU and enhancing the quality and quantity of financial intelligence analysis and disseminations; (9) prioritizing parallel financial investigations and demonstrating an increase in the number of ML investigations and prosecutions undertaken; and (10) demonstrating that there is monitoring of FIs and DNFBPs for compliance with PF TFS obligations and that there is co-operation and co-ordination between authorities to prevent PF TFS from being evaded.

YEMEN

(Statement from February 2023)

Since February 2010, when Yemen made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Yemen has made progress to improve its AML/CFT regime. In June 2014, the FATF determined that Yemen had substantially addressed its action plan at a technical level, including by: (1) adequately criminalising money laundering and terrorist financing; (2) establishing procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets; (3) improving its customer due diligence and suspicious transaction reporting requirements; (4) issuing guidance; (5) developing the monitoring and supervisory capacity of the financial sector supervisory authorities and the financial intelligence unit; and (6) establishing a fully operational and effectively functioning financial intelligence unit. While the FATF determined that Yemen has completed its agreed action plan, due to the security situation, the FATF has been unable to conduct an on-site visit to confirm whether the process of implementing the required reforms and actions has begun and is being sustained. The FATF will continue to monitor the situation, and conduct an on-site visit at the earliest possible date.

JURISDICTIONS NO LONGER SUBJECT TO INCREASED MONITORING BY THE FATF

JAMAICA

The FATF welcomes Jamaica’s significant progress in improving its AML/CFT regime. Jamaica strengthened the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime to meet the commitments in its action plan regarding the strategic deficiencies that the FATF identified in February 2020 by, (1) developing a more comprehensive understanding of its ML/TF risk; (2) including all FIs and DNFBPs in the AML/CFT regime and implementing adequate risk based supervision in all sectors; (3) taking appropriate measures to prevent legal persons and arrangements from being misused for criminal purposes, and ensuring that accurate and up to date basic and beneficial ownership information is available on a timely basis; (4) taking proper measures to increase ML investigations and prosecutions, in line with the country’s risk profile, and increasing the use of financial intelligence in ML investigations; (5) implementing targeted financial sanctions for terrorist financing without delay; and (6) implementing a risk based approach for supervision of its NPO sector to prevent abuse for TF purposes. Jamaica is therefore no longer subject to the FATF’s increased monitoring process.

Jamaica should continue to work with CFATF to sustain its improvements in its AML/CFT system. 

TÜRKIYE

The FATF welcomes Türkiye’s significant progress in improving its AML/CFT regime. Türkiye strengthened the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime to meet the commitments in its action plan regarding the strategic deficiencies that the FATF identified in October 2021 including by (1) dedicating more resources at the FIU to supervision of AML/CFT compliance by high-risk sectors and increasing on-site inspections overall; (2) applying dissuasive sanctions for AML/CFT breaches, in particular for unregistered money transfer services and exchange offices and in relation to the requirements of adequate, accurate, and up-to-date beneficial ownership information; (3) enhancing the use of financial intelligence to support ML investigations and increasing proactive disseminations by the FIU; (4) undertaking more complex money laundering investigations and prosecutions; (5) setting out clear responsibilities and measurable performance objectives and metrics for the authorities responsible for recovering criminal assets and pursuing terrorism financing cases and using statistics to update risk assessments and inform policy; (6) conducting more financial investigations in terrorism cases, prioritising TF investigations and prosecutions related to UN-designated groups and ensuring TF investigations are extended to identify financing and support networks; (7) concerning targeted financial sanctions under UNSCRs 1373 and 1267, pursuing outgoing requests and domestic designations related to UN-designated groups, in line with Turkey’s risk profile; (8) implementing a risk-based approach to oversight of non-profit organisations to prevent their abuse for terrorist financing, conducting outreach to a broad range of NPOs in the sector and engaging with their feedback, ensuring that sanctions applied are proportionate to any violations, and taking steps to ensure that supervision does not disrupt or discourage legitimate NPO activity, such as fundraising. Türkiye is therefore no longer subject to the FATF’s increased monitoring process.

Türkiye should continue to work with the FATF to sustain its improvements in its AML/CFT system, including by continuing to ensure its oversight of the NPO sector is risk-based and in line with the FATF standards. 

https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-june-2024.html 

High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action – October 2023

High-risk jurisdictions have significant strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and financing of proliferation. For all countries identified as high-risk, the FATF calls on all members and urges all jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence, and, in the most serious cases, countries are called upon to apply counter-measures to protect the international financial system from the money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing (ML/TF/PF) risks emanating from the country. This list is often externally referred to as the “black list”. Since February 2020, in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, the FATF has paused the review process for Iran and DPRK, given that they are already subject to the FATF’s call for countermeasures. Iran reported in July 2023 with no material changes in the status of its action plan. Thus, the FATF reiterates its call to apply countermeasure on these high-risk jurisdictions included in its 21 February 2020 statement.

Jurisdictions subject to a FATF call on its members and other jurisdictions to apply countermeasures

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)

[statement unchanged since February 2020]

The FATF remains concerned by the DPRK’s failure to address the significant deficiencies in its anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime and the serious threats they pose to the integrity of the international financial system. The FATF urges the DPRK to immediately and meaningfully address its AML/CFT deficiencies. Further, the FATF has serious concerns with the threat posed by the DPRK’s illicit activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and its financing.

The FATF reaffirms its 25 February 2011 call on its members and urges all jurisdictions to advise their financial institutions to give special attention to business relationships and transactions with the DPRK, including DPRK companies, financial institutions, and those acting on their behalf. In addition to enhanced scrutiny, the FATF further calls on its members and urges all jurisdictions to apply effective counter-measures, and targeted financial sanctions in accordance with applicable United Nations Security Council Resolutions, to protect their financial sectors from money laundering, financing of terrorism and WMD proliferation financing (ML/TF/PF) risks emanating from the DPRK. Jurisdictions should take necessary measures to close existing branches, subsidiaries and representative offices of DPRK banks within their territories and terminate correspondent relationships with DPRK banks, where required by relevant UNSC resolutions.

Iran

[statement unchanged since February 2020]

In June 2016, Iran committed to address its strategic deficiencies. Iran’s action plan expired in January 2018. In February 2020, the FATF noted Iran has not completed the action plan.

In October 2019, the FATF called upon its members and urged all jurisdictions to: require increased supervisory examination for branches and subsidiaries of financial institutions based in Iran; introduce enhanced relevant reporting mechanisms or systematic reporting of financial transactions; and require increased external audit requirements for financial groups with respect to any of their branches and subsidiaries located in Iran.

Now, given Iran’s failure to enact the Palermo and Terrorist Financing Conventions in line with the FATF Standards, the FATF fully lifts the suspension of counter-measures and calls on its members and urges all jurisdictions to apply effective counter-measures, in line with Recommendation 19.

Iran will remain on the FATF statement on High Risk Jurisdictions Subject to a Call for Action until the full Action Plan has been completed. If Iran ratifies the Palermo and Terrorist Financing Conventions, in line with the FATF standards, the FATF will decide on next steps, including whether to suspend countermeasures. Until Iran implements the measures required to address the deficiencies identified with respect to countering terrorism-financing in the Action Plan, the FATF will remain concerned with the terrorist financing risk emanating from Iran and the threat this poses to the international financial system.

Jurisdiction subject to a FATF call on its members and other jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence measures proportionate to the risks arising from the jurisdiction

Myanmar

In February 2020, Myanmar committed to address its strategic deficiencies. Myanmar’s action plan expired in September 2021.

In June 2022, the FATF strongly urged Myanmar to swiftly complete its action plan by October 2022 or the FATF would call on its members and urge all jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence to business relations and transactions with Myanmar. Given the continued lack of progress and the majority of its action items still not addressed after a year beyond the action plan deadline, the FATF decided that further action was necessary in line with its procedures and FATF calls on its members and other jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence measures proportionate to the risk arising from Myanmar. When applying enhanced due diligence measures, countries should ensure that flows of funds for humanitarian assistance, legitimate NPO activity and remittances are not disrupted.

Myanmar should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address these deficiencies, including by: (1) demonstrating an improved understanding of ML risks in key areas; (2) demonstrating that on-site/offsite inspections are risk-based, and hundi operators are registered and supervised; (3) demonstrating enhanced use of financial intelligence in law enforcement authorities (LEAs) investigations, and increasing operational analysis and disseminations by the financial intelligence unit (FIU); (4) ensuring that ML is investigated/prosecuted in line with risks; (5) demonstrating investigation of transnational ML cases with international cooperation; (6) demonstrating an increase in the freezing/seizing and confiscation of criminal proceeds, instrumentalities, and/or property of equivalent value; and (7) managing seized assets to preserve the value of seized goods until confiscation.

The FATF urges Myanmar to work to fully address its AML/CFT deficiencies, including to demonstrate that its monitoring and supervision of money or value transfer services (MVTS) is based on documented and sound understanding of ML/TF risks to mitigate undue scrutiny of legitimate financial flows.

Myanmar will remain on the list of countries subject to a call for action until its full action plan is completed.

Jurisdiction subject to a FATF call on its members and other jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence measures proportionate to the risks arising from the jurisdiction

Jurisdictions under increased monitoring are actively working with the FATF to address strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing. When the FATF places a jurisdiction under increased monitoring, it means the country has committed to resolve swiftly the identified strategic deficiencies within agreed timeframes and is subject to increased monitoring. This list is often externally referred to as the “grey list”.

The FATF and FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs) continue to work with the jurisdictions below as they report on the progress achieved in addressing their strategic deficiencies. The FATF calls on these jurisdictions to complete their action plans expeditiously and within the agreed timeframes. The FATF welcomes their commitment and will closely monitor their progress. The FATF does not call for the application of enhanced due diligence measures to be applied to these jurisdictions. The FATF Standards do not envisage de-risking, or cutting-off entire classes of customers, but call for the application of a risk-based approach. Therefore, the FATF encourages its members and all jurisdictions to take into account the information presented below in their risk analysis.

The FATF identifies additional jurisdictions, on an on-going basis, that have strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing. A number of jurisdictions have not yet been reviewed by the FATF or their FSRBs, but will be in due course.

The FATF provides some flexibility to jurisdictions not facing immediate deadlines to report progress on a voluntary basis. The following countries had their progress reviewed by the FATF since October 2023: Albania, Barbados, Burkina Faso, Cayman Islands, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gibraltar, Haiti, Jamaica, Jordan, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Panama, Philippines, Senegal, South Africa, South Sudan, Tanzania, Türkiye, UAE, and Uganda. For these countries, updated statements are provided below. Cameroon, Croatia, Syria and Vietnam chose to defer reporting; thus, the statements previously issued for those jurisdictions are included below, but this may not necessarily reflect the most recent status of the jurisdictions’ AML/CFT regimes. Following review, the FATF now also identifies Bulgaria.

BARBADOS

In February 2020, Barbados made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. At its October 2023 Plenary, the FATF made the initial determination that Barbados has substantially completed its action plan and warrants an on-site assessment to verify that the implementation of the AML/CFT reforms has begun and is being sustained, and that the necessary political commitment remains in place to sustain implementation in the future.

Barbados has made the following key reforms, including: (1) conducting risk-based supervision of financial institutions and applying sanctions as appropriate, (2) ensuring that accurate and up-to-date beneficial ownership information is available on a timely basis, (3) improving and enhancing the use of financial intelligence, and (4) pursuing repatriation and sharing of confiscated assets with other countries.

BULGARIA

In October 2023, Bulgaria made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MONEYVAL to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its MER in May 2022, Bulgaria has made progress on its MER’s recommended actions to improve its international cooperation. Bulgaria will work to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) implementing its national AML/CFT Strategy through adopting a comprehensive action plan; (2) addressing the remaining technical compliance deficiencies; (3) demonstrating initial implementation of risk-based supervision for postal money operators, currency exchange providers and real estate agents and establishing market entry controls for VASPs and postal money operators; (4) ensuring that the beneficial ownership information held in the Register is accurate and up-to-date; (5) completing the implementation of the automated system to ensure more automated prioritisation of STRs; (6) improving investigations and prosecutions of different types of money laundering in line with risks, including high-scale corruption and organised crime; (7) ensuring that confiscation is pursued as a policy objective; (8) ensuring the ability to conduct parallel financial investigations in all terrorism investigations; (9) addressing gaps in the TF and PF targeted financial sanctions (TFS) frameworks; and (10) identifying the subset of NPOs most vulnerable to TF abuse and demonstrating initial implementation of risk-based monitoring to prevent abuse for TF purposes.

BURKINA FASO

Since February 2021, when Burkina Faso made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Burkina Faso has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by conducting thematic risk assessments for high-risk sectors and strengthening its mechanisms to maintain statistics on international cooperation and ML/TF investigations and prosecutions. Burkina Faso should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) strengthening resource capacities of all AML/CFT supervisory authorities and implementing risk based supervision of FIs and DNFBPs; (2) maintaining comprehensive and updated basic and beneficial ownership information of legal persons and strengthening the system of sanctions for violations of transparency obligations; (3) increasing the diversity of suspicious transactions reporting; (4) establishing procedures for effective implementation of declaration of cross-border transportation of currencies and bearer negotiable instruments; (5) conducting TF investigations and prosecutions in line with its risk profile; and (6) implementing an effective TFS regime related to TF and PF as well as risk-based monitoring and supervision of NPOs.

The FATF notes Burkina Faso’s continued progress across its action plan, however all deadlines have expired and work remains. The FATF urges Burkina Faso to swiftly implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies as soon as possible as all deadlines expired in December 2022.

CAMEROON

(Statement from June 2023)          

In June 2023, Cameroon made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GABAC to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its MER in October 2021, Cameroon has made progress on some of the MER’s recommended actions by increasing the resources of the FIU and building the capacity of investigation authorities and judicial bodies to effectively conduct ML/TF cases. Cameroon will work to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) Aligning AML/CFT national strategies and policies with the findings of the NRA and monitoring their implementation, and demonstrating AML/CFT cooperation and coordination between competent authorities; (2) Ensuring risk-based prioritisation of incoming international cooperation requests in line with risks and responding in an effective manner; (3) Enhancing risk-based supervision of banks and implementing effective risk-based supervision for non-bank FIs and DNFBPs, and conducting appropriate outreach to high-risk FIs and DNFBPs; (4) Maintaining and ensuring timely access by competent authorities to adequate and up to date beneficial ownership information on legal persons, and establishing a sanctions regime for violations of transparency obligations applicable to legal persons; (5) Enhancing secure information exchange between the FIU, reporting entities and competent authorities and demonstrating an increase in dissemination of intelligence reports to support operational needs of competent authorities; (6) Demonstrating that authorities are able to conduct a range of ML investigations, and prosecute ML in line with risks; (7) Implementing policies and procedures for seizing and confiscating proceeds and instrumentalities of crime and managing frozen, seized and confiscated property, and prioritising seizure and confiscation of assets at the border; (8) Demonstrating that TF investigations and prosecutions are pursued in line with risk; and (9) Demonstrating effective implementation of TF and PF TFS regimes and implementing a risk-based approach to NPOs without disrupting legitimate NPO activities.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Since October 2022, when the DRC made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GABAC to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, the DRC has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by finalising the national risk assessment (NRA), designating a supervisory authority for all DNFBPs and providing more resources to the FIU. The DRC should continue to work to implement its FATF action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) disseminating the NRA on ML and TF and adopting an AML/CFT national strategy; (2) developing and implementing a risk-based supervision plan; (3) building the capacity of the FIU to conduct operational and strategic analysis; (4) strengthening the capabilities of authorities involved in the investigation and prosecution of ML and TF; and (5) demonstrating effective implementation of TF and PF-related TFS.

CROATIA

(Statement from June 2023)

In June 2023, Croatia made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MONEYVAL to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its MER in December 2021, Croatia has made progress on its MER’s recommended actions to improve its system by licensing and monitoring the registration of VASPs, enhancing and implementing more effective sanctions in supervisory activities and enhancing implementation of preventive measures for high-risk sectors. Croatia will work to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) Completing the national risk assessment, including assessing the ML/TF risk associated with the misuse of legal persons and legal arrangements and the use of cash in the real estate sector; (2) Increasing FIU human resources and improving analytical capabilities; (3) Continuing to improve LEAs detection, investigation and prosecution of different types of ML, including ML involving a foreign predicate offences and the misuse of legal persons; (4) Demonstrating a sustained increase in the application of provisional measures in securing direct/indirect proceeds, as well as foreign proceeds subject to confiscation; (5) Demonstrating the ability to systematically detect and where relevant investigate TF in line with its risk profile; (6) Establishing a national framework for the implementation of UN TFS measures and providing guidance and conducting outreach and training to the reporting entities; and (7) Identifying the subset of NPOs most vulnerable to TF abuse and providing targeted outreach to NPOs and to the donor community on potential vulnerabilities of NPOs to TF abuse.

GIBRALTAR

In June 2022, Gibraltar made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MONEYVAL to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. At its October 2023 Plenary, the FATF made the initial determination that Gibraltar has substantially completed its action plan and warrants an on-site assessment to verify that the implementation of AML/CFT reforms has begun and is being sustained and that the necessary political commitment remains in place to sustain implementation in the future.

Gibraltar has made the following key reforms, including: (1) applying effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions for AML/CFT breaches in non-bank financial institutions and DNFBPs sectors; and (2) pursuing final confiscation judgments commensurate with the risk and context of Gibraltar.

HAITI

Since June 2021, when Haiti made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Haiti has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by facilitating information sharing with relevant foreign counterparts and addressing technical deficiencies in its ML offence, TF offence, and AML/CFT preventive measures. The FATF recognises the political commitment expressed at a high level and the efforts demonstrated by Haiti to advance its commitments in the midst of the challenging social, economic and security situation within the country. Haiti should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) completing its ML/TF risk assessment process and disseminating the findings; (2) implementing risk-based AML/CFT supervision for all financial institutions and DNFBPs deemed to constitute a higher ML/TF risk; (3) ensuring basic and beneficial ownership information are maintained and accessible in a timely manner; (4) ensuring a better use of financial intelligence and other relevant information by competent authorities for combatting ML and TF; (5) demonstrating authorities are identifying, investigating and prosecuting ML cases in a manner consistent with Haiti’s risk profile; (6) demonstrating an increase of identification, tracing and recovery of proceeds of crimes; (7) addressing the technical deficiencies in its targeted financial sanctions regime; and (8) conducting appropriate risk-based monitoring of NPOs vulnerable to TF abuse without disrupting or discouraging legitimate NPO activities.

The FATF notes Haiti’s continued progress across its action plan, however all deadlines have now expired and work remains. The FATF encourages Haiti to continue to implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies.

JAMAICA

Since February 2020, when Jamaica made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Jamaica has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by ensuring adequate, risk-based supervision in all DNFBP sectors. Jamaica should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies by demonstrating that accurate and up-to-date basic and beneficial ownership information is available on a timely basis to competent authorities, and effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions are applied.

The FATF again expresses concern that Jamaica failed to complete its action plan, which fully expired in January 2022. The FATF strongly urges Jamaica to swiftly demonstrate significant progress in completing its action plan by February 2024 or the FATF will consider next steps, which could include calling on its members and urging all jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence to business relations and transactions with Jamaica.

MALI

Since October 2021, when Mali made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Mali has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by developing risk assessment methodology for inspections of high risk DNFBPs, demonstrating the application of sanctions for AML/CFT noncompliance, and strengthening the capacity of law enforcement in ML and TF investigations and prosecutions. Mali should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) disseminating its assessment of ML/TF risks associated with all types of legal persons and demonstrating timely access to accurate beneficial ownership information; (2) identifying and investigating TF activities in line with the country’s risk profile, including by conducting parallel financial investigations and employing other criminal justice measures where a TF conviction is not possible; (3) strengthening and implementing the legal framework and procedures for TFS related to TF and PF; and (4) implementing a risk-based approach for supervision of the NPO sector to prevent abuse for TF purposes.

The FATF notes Mali’s continued progress across its action plan, however all deadlines have now expired and work remains. The FATF encourages Mali to continue to implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies as soon as possible.

MOZAMBIQUE

In October 2022, Mozambique made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Mozambique should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) ensuring cooperation and coordination amongst relevant authorities to implement risk-based AML/CFT strategies and policies; (2) conducting training for all LEAs on mutual legal assistance to enhance the gathering of evidence or seizure/confiscation of proceeds of crime; (3) providing adequate financial and human resources to supervisors, developing and implementing a risk-based supervision plan; (4) providing adequate resources to the authorities to commence the collection of adequate, accurate and up-to-date beneficial ownership information of legal persons; (5) increasing the human resources of the FIU as well as increasing financial intelligence sent to authorities; (6) demonstrating LEAs capability to effectively investigate ML/TF cases using financial intelligence; (7) conducting a comprehensive TF Risk Assessment and begin implementing a comprehensive national CFT strategy; (8) increasing awareness on TF and PF-related TFS; and (9) carrying out the TF risk assessment for NPOs in line with the FATF Standards and using it as a basis to develop an outreach plan.

NIGERIA

Since February 2023, when Nigeria made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Nigeria has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by completing its residual ML/TF risk assessment. Nigeria should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) disseminating its residual ML/TF risk assessment and updating its national AML/CFT strategy to ensure alignment with other national strategies relevant to high-risk predicate offences; (2) enhancing formal and informal international cooperation in line with ML/TF risks; (3) improving AML/CFT risk-based supervision of FIs and DNFBPs and enhancing implementation of preventive measures for high-risk sectors; (4) ensuring that competent authorities have timely access to accurate and up-to-date beneficial ownership (BO) information on legal persons and applying sanctions for breaches of BO obligations; (5) demonstrating an increase in the dissemination of financial intelligence by the FIU and its use by LEAs; (6) demonstrating a sustained increase in ML investigations and prosecutions in line with ML risks; (7) proactively detecting violations of currency declaration obligations and apply appropriate sanctions and maintaining comprehensive data on frozen, seized, confiscated, and disposed assets; (8) demonstrating sustained increase in investigations and prosecutions of different types of TF activities in line with risk and enhancing interagency cooperation on TF investigations; and (9) conducting risk-based and targeted outreach to NPOs at risk of TF abuse and implementing risk-based monitoring for the subset of NPOs at risk of TF abuse without disrupting or discouraging legitimate NPO activities.

PHILIPPINES

In June 2021, the Philippines made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. The Philippines should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) demonstrating that effective risk-based supervision of DNFBPs is occurring; (2) demonstrating that supervisors are using AML/CFT controls to mitigate risks associated with casino junkets; (3) enhancing and streamlining LEA access to BO information and taking steps to ensure that BO information is accurate and up-to-date; (4) demonstrating an increase in ML investigations and prosecutions in line with risk; and (5) demonstrating an increase in the identification, investigation and prosecution of TF cases.

The FATF urges the Philippines to swiftly implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies as soon as possible as all deadlines expired in January 2023.

SENEGAL

Since February 2021, when Senegal made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Senegal has conducted analysis to understand the risk of abuse of NPOs for TF purposes and conducted risk-based outreach to NPOs. Senegal should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) improving compliance by detecting AML/CFT violations and imposing effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions against non-compliant DNFBPs; (2) updating and maintaining comprehensive beneficial ownership information on legal persons and arrangements; (3) identifying and investigating TF activities in line with the country’s risk profile; and (4) implementing an effective TFS regime related to TF and PF as well as risk-based monitoring and supervision of NPOs.

The FATF notes Senegal’s continued progress across its action plan, however all deadlines have expired and work remains. The FATF urges Senegal to swiftly implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies as soon as possible as all deadlines expired in September 2022.

SOUTH AFRICA

Since February 2023, when South Africa made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, South Africa has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime including by addressing technical deficiencies in its targeted financial sanction regime related to proliferation financing. South Africa should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) demonstrating a sustained increase in outbound MLA requests that help facilitate ML/TF investigations and confiscations of different types of assets in line with its risk profile; (2) improving risk-based supervision of DNFBPs and demonstrating that all AML/CFT supervisors apply effective, proportionate, and effective sanctions for noncompliance; (3) ensuring that competent authorities have timely access to accurate and up-to-date BO information on legal persons and arrangements and applying sanctions for breaches of violation by legal persons to BO obligations; (4) demonstrating a sustained increase in law enforcement agencies’ requests for financial intelligence from the FIC for its ML/TF investigations; (5) demonstrate a sustained increase in investigations and prosecutions of serious and complex money laundering and the full range of TF activities in line with its risk profile; (6) enhancing its identification, seizure and confiscation of proceeds and instrumentalities of a wider range of predicate crimes, in line with its risk profile; (7) updating its TF Risk Assessment to inform the implementation of a comprehensive national counter financing of terrorism strategy; and (8) ensuring the effective implementation of targeted financial sanctions and demonstrating an effective mechanism to identify individuals and entities that meet the criteria for domestic designation.

SOUTH SUDAN

Since June 2021, when South Sudan made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, South Sudan has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by ensuring that the FIU is the central authority for the receipt and analysis of STRs and identifying NPOs falling within the FATF’s definition of NPOs. South Sudan should continue to work to implement its action plan, including by: (1) conducting a comprehensive review of the AML/CFT Act (2012), with the support of international partners, including technical assistance, to comply with the FATF Standards; (2) becoming a party to and fully implementing the 1988 Vienna Convention, the 2000 Palermo Convention, and the 1999 Terrorist Financing Convention; (3) ensuring that competent authorities are suitably structured and capacitated to implement a risk-based approach to AML/CFT supervision for financial institutions; (4) developing a comprehensive legal framework to collect and verify the accuracy of beneficial ownership information for legal persons; (5) operationalising a fully functioning and independent FIU; (6) establishing and implementing the legal and institutional framework to implement targeted financial sanctions in compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions on terrorism and WMD proliferation financing; and (7) commencing implementation of targeted risk-based supervision/monitoring of NPOs at risk of TF abuse.

The FATF notes South Sudan’s limited progress across its action plan with all deadlines now expired and work remaining. The FATF again encourages South Sudan to continue to implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies as soon as possible and demonstrate strong political and institutional commitment to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, particularly in supporting the lead AML/CFT agency in coordinating national AML/CFT efforts.

SYRIA

(Statement from February 2023)

Since February 2010, when Syria made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Syria has made progress to improve its AML/CFT regime. In June 2014, the FATF determined that Syria had substantially addressed its action plan at a technical level, including by criminalising terrorist financing and establishing procedures for freezing terrorist assets. While the FATF determined that Syria has completed its agreed action plan, due to the security situation, the FATF has been unable to conduct an on-site visit to confirm whether the process of implementing the required reforms and actions has begun and is being sustained. The FATF will continue to monitor the situation, and will conduct an on-site visit at the earliest possible date.

TANZANIA

Since October 2022, when Tanzania made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Tanzania has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by addressing technical deficiencies with R.10 and conducting outreach to DNFBPs. Tanzania should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) improving risk-based supervision of FIs and DNFBPs, including by conducting inspections on a risk-sensitive basis and applying effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions for non-compliance; (2) demonstrating authorities’ capability to effectively conduct a range of investigations and prosecutions of ML in line with the country’s risk profile; (3) demonstrating that LEAs are taking measures to identify, trace, seize, and confiscate proceeds and instrumentalities of crime; (4) conducting a comprehensive TF Risk Assessment and begin implementing a comprehensive national CFT strategy as well as demonstrating capability to conduct TF investigations and pursue prosecutions in line with the country’s risk profile; (5) increasing awareness of the private sector and competent authorities on TF and PF-related TFS; and (6) carrying out the TF risk assessment for NPOs in line with the FATF Standards and using it as a basis to develop an outreach plan.

TÜRKIYE

Since October 2021, when Türkiye made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Türkiye has taken positive steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by undertaking more complex ML investigations and prosecutions in line with risks, and conducting parallel financial investigations in terrorism cases, including prioritising TF investigations and prosecutions related to UN-designated groups. Türkiye should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its one remaining strategic deficiency, specifically by confiscating assets related to terrorist financing consistent with its terrorist financing risk.

The FATF notes Türkiye continued progress across its action plan; however, all deadlines have now expired. The FATF encourages Türkiye to continue to implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiency as soon as possible.

UGANDA

In February 2020, Uganda made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. At its October 2023 plenary, the FATF made the initial determination that Uganda has substantially completed its action plan and warrants an on-site assessment to verify that the implementation of AML/CFT reforms has begun and is being sustained, and that the necessary political commitment remains in place to sustain implementation in the future.

Uganda has made the following key reforms, including: (1) adopting a national AML/CFT strategy; (2) enhancing the use of MLA and maintaining statistics; (3) developing and implementing risk-based supervision of the financial and DNFBP sectors; (4) assessing the ML/TF risks related to legal persons and ensuring that competent authorities have timely access to accurate basic and beneficial ownership information; (5) pursuing ML investigations and prosecutions, applying ML charges consistent with the country’s risk profile and establishing procedures to trace and seize proceeds of crimes; (6) demonstrating an ability to conduct TF investigation and prosecution; (7) implementing PF-related TFS and developing an outreach and risk-based oversight plan to protect NPOs from TF abuse.

The FATF continues to monitor Uganda’s oversight of the NPO sector to encourage the application of the risk-based approach to supervision of NPOs in line with the FATF Standards and mitigate unintended consequences.

THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

In February 2022, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. At its October 2023 plenary, the FATF made the initial determination that UAE has substantially completed its action plan and warrants an on-site assessment to verify that the implementation of AML/CFT reforms has begun and is being sustained, and that the necessary political commitment remains in place to sustain implementation in the future.

UAE has made the following key reforms, including: (1) increasing outbound MLA requests to facilitate ML/TF investigations; (2) improving its understanding of ML/TF risks and implementation of risk-based CDD for DNFBP sectors, applying effective and proportionate sanctions for AML/CFT noncompliance involving FIs and DNFBPs, and increasing STR filing for those sectors; (3) developing a more granular understanding of risk of abuse of legal persons and implementing risk-based mitigating measures to prevent their abuse; (4) providing additional resources to the FIU to increase its capacity to provide financial intelligence to LEA and making greater use of financial intelligence, including from foreign counterparts, to pursue high-risk ML threats; (5) increasing investigations and prosecution of ML in line with the country’s risk profile; (6) ensuring effective implementation of TFS by sanctioning noncompliance among reporting entities and demonstrating a better understanding of UN sanctions evasion among the private sector.

VIETNAM

(Statement from June 2023)

In June 2023, Vietnam made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its MER in November 2021, Vietnam has made progress on some of the MER’s recommended actions by joining the Asset Recovery Interagency Network Asia Pacific (ARIN-AP) and adopting a national action plan on AML/CFT/CPF. Vietnam will work to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) Increasing risk understanding, domestic co-ordination and co-operation to combat ML/TF; (2) Enhancing international co-operation; (3) Implementing effective risk-based supervision for FIs and DNFBPs; (4) Taking action to regulate virtual assets and virtual asset service providers; (5) Addressing technical compliance deficiencies, including with respect to the ML offence, targeted financial sanctions, customer due diligence and suspicious transaction reporting; (6) Conducing outreach activities with the private sector; (7) Establishing a regime that provides competent authorities with adequate, accurate and up-to-date information on beneficial ownership; (8) Ensuring the independence of the FIU and enhancing the quality and quantity of financial intelligence analysis and disseminations; (9) Prioritizing parallel financial investigations and demonstrating an increase in the number of ML investigations and prosecutions undertaken; (10) demonstrating that there is monitoring of FIs and DNFBPs for compliance with PF TFS obligations and that there is co-operation and co-ordination between authorities to prevent PF TFS from being evaded.

YEMEN

(Statement from February 2023)

Since February 2010, when Yemen made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Yemen has made progress to improve its AML/CFT regime. In June 2014, the FATF determined that Yemen had substantially addressed its action plan at a technical level, including by: (1) adequately criminalising money laundering and terrorist financing; (2) establishing procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets; (3) improving its customer due diligence and suspicious transaction reporting requirements; (4) issuing guidance; (5) developing the monitoring and supervisory capacity of the financial sector supervisory authorities and the financial intelligence unit; and (6) establishing a fully operational and effectively functioning financial intelligence unit. While the FATF determined that Yemen has completed its agreed action plan, due to the security situation, the FATF has been unable to conduct an on-site visit to confirm whether the process of implementing the required reforms and actions has begun and is being sustained. The FATF will continue to monitor the situation, and conduct an on-site visit at the earliest possible date.

Jurisdictions No Longer Subject to Increased Monitoring by the FATF

ALBANIA

The FATF welcomes Albania’s significant progress in improving its AML/CFT regime. Albania strengthened the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime to meet the commitments in its action plan regarding the strategic deficiencies that the FATF identified in February 2020 related to (1) conducting additional in-depth analysis to understand its ML and other risks sufficiently, and enhancing institutional coordination and cooperation; formalising the economy and reducing the ML/TF risks posed by the widespread use of cash; and registering property ownership information across nearly the entire country (2) improving the timely handling of mutual legal assistance requests; (3) establishing effective mechanisms to detect and prevent criminal infiltration of the economy, including by strengthening competent authorities’ powers to take necessary action; (4) ensuring that accurate and up to date basic and beneficial ownership information is available on a timely basis; (5) increasing the number and improving the sophistication of prosecutions and confiscations for ML, especially in cases involving foreign predicate offenses or third-party ML; (6) improving the implementation of targeted financial sanctions, in particular through enhanced supervisory action and targeted, proactive outreach. Albania is therefore no longer subject to the FATF’s increased monitoring process.

The FATF welcomes Albania’s commitment to respect the FATF principles in case Albania introduces a VTC programme in the future.

Albania should continue to work with MONEYVAL to sustain its improvements in its AML/CFT system.

CAYMAN ISLANDS

The FATF welcomes the Cayman Islands’ significant progress in improving its AML/CFT regime. The Cayman Islands strengthened the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime to meet the commitments in its action plan regarding the strategic deficiencies that the FATF identified in February 2021 related to (1) applying sanctions that are effective, proportionate and dissuasive, and taking administrative penalties and enforcement actions against obliged entities to ensure that breaches are remediated effectively and in a timely manner; (2) imposing adequate and effective sanctions in cases where relevant parties (including legal persons) do not file accurate, adequate and up to date beneficial ownership information; and (3) demonstrating that they are prosecuting all types of money laundering in line with the jurisdiction’s risk profile and that such prosecutions are resulting in the application of dissuasive, effective, and proportionate sanctions. The Cayman Islands is therefore no longer subject to the FATF’s increased monitoring process.

The Cayman Islands should continue to work with CFATF to sustain its improvements in its AML/CFT system.

JORDAN

The FATF welcomes Jordan’s significant progress in improving its AML/CFT regime. Jordan strengthened the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime to meet the commitments in its action plan regarding the strategic deficiencies that the FATF identified in October 2021 related to (1) completing and disseminating the ML/TF risk assessments of legal persons and virtual assets; (2) strengthening risk-based supervision and conducting training for FIs and DNFBPs; (3) maintaining comprehensive and updated basic and beneficial ownership information on legal persons; (4) pursuing money laundering investigations and prosecutions for predicate offences in line with its risk profile and strengthening the sanctioning and confiscation regime, including at the border; (5) implementing a legal and institutional framework for TFS; and (6) conducting risk-based monitoring of NPOs without disrupting legitimate NPO activities. Jordan is therefore no longer subject to the FATF’s increased monitoring process.

Jordan should continue to work with MENAFATF to sustain its improvements in its AML/CFT system.

PANAMA

The FATF welcomes Panama’s significant progress in improving its AML/CFT regime. Panama strengthened the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime to meet the commitments in its action plan regarding the strategic deficiencies that the FATF identified in June 2019 related to (1) strengthening its understanding of the national and sectoral ML/TF risk and informing findings to its national policies to mitigate the identified risks; (2) taking action to identify unlicensed money remitters, applying a risk-based approach to supervision of the DNFBP sector and applying effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions against AML/CFT violations; (3) verifying updated beneficial ownership information by obliged entities, establishing mechanisms to monitor the activities of offshore entities, assessing the existing risks of misuse of legal persons and arrangements to define and implement specific measures to prevent the misuse of nominee shareholders and directors, and allowing timely access to adequate and accurate beneficial ownership information; and (4) using FIU products for ML investigations, demonstrating its ability to investigate and prosecute ML involving foreign tax crimes and providing constructive and timely international cooperation with such offence, and continuing to focus on ML investigations in relation to high-risk areas identified in the NRA and MER. Panama is therefore no longer subject to the FATF’s increased monitoring process.

Panama should continue to work with GAFILAT to sustain its improvements in its AML/CFT system.

See the link below to access the notice on the FATF website

https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/Call-for-action-october-2023.html

High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action - 24 February 2023 

High-risk jurisdictions have significant strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and financing of proliferation. For all countries identified as high-risk, the FATF calls on all members and urges all jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence, and, in the most serious cases, countries are called upon to apply counter-measures to protect the international financial system from the money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing (ML/TF/PF) risks emanating from the country. This list is often externally referred to as the “black list”. Since February 2020, in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, the FATF has paused the review process for Iran and DPRK, given that they are already subject to the FATF’s call for countermeasures. Therefore, please refer to the statement on these jurisdictions adopted on 21 February 2020. While the statement may not necessarily reflect the most recent status of Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s AML/CFT regimes, the FATF’s call to apply countermeasure on these high-risk jurisdictions remains in effect.

Jurisdictions subject to a FATF call on its members and other jurisdictions to apply countermeasures

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)

[unchanged since February 2020]

The FATF remains concerned by the DPRK’s failure to address the significant deficiencies in its anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime and the serious threats they pose to the integrity of the international financial system. The FATF urges the DPRK to immediately and meaningfully address its AML/CFT deficiencies. Further, the FATF has serious concerns with the threat posed by the DPRK’s illicit activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and its financing.

The FATF reaffirms its 25 February 2011 call on its members and urges all jurisdictions to advise their financial institutions to give special attention to business relationships and transactions with the DPRK, including DPRK companies, financial institutions, and those acting on their behalf. In addition to enhanced scrutiny, the FATF further calls on its members and urges all jurisdictions to apply effective counter-measures, and targeted financial sanctions in accordance with applicable United Nations Security Council Resolutions, to protect their financial sectors from money laundering, financing of terrorism and WMD proliferation financing (ML/TF/PF) risks emanating from the DPRK. Jurisdictions should take necessary measures to close existing branches, subsidiaries and representative offices of DPRK banks within their territories and terminate correspondent relationships with DPRK banks, where required by relevant UNSC resolutions.

Iran

[unchanged since February 2020]

In June 2016, Iran committed to address its strategic deficiencies. Iran’s action plan expired in January 2018. In February 2020, the FATF noted Iran has not completed the action plan.

In October 2019, the FATF called upon its members and urged all jurisdictions to: require increased supervisory examination for branches and subsidiaries of financial institutions based in Iran; introduce enhanced relevant reporting mechanisms or systematic reporting of financial transactions; and require increased external audit requirements for financial groups with respect to any of their branches and subsidiaries located in Iran.

Now, given Iran’s failure to enact the Palermo and Terrorist Financing Conventions in line with the FATF Standards, the FATF fully lifts the suspension of counter-measures and calls on its members and urges all jurisdictions to apply effective counter-measures, in line with Recommendation 19.[3]

Iran will remain on the FATF statement on [High Risk Jurisdictions Subject to a Call for Action] until the full Action Plan has been completed. If Iran ratifies the Palermo and Terrorist Financing Conventions, in line with the FATF standards, the FATF will decide on next steps, including whether to suspend countermeasures. Until Iran implements the measures required to address the deficiencies identified with respect to countering terrorism-financing in the Action Plan, the FATF will remain concerned with the terrorist financing risk emanating from Iran and the threat this poses to the international financial system.

Jurisdiction subject to a FATF call on its members and other jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence measures proportionate to the risks arising from the jurisdiction

Myanmar

[unchanged since October 2022]

In February 2020, Myanmar committed to address its strategic deficiencies. Myanmar’s action plan expired in September 2021.

In June 2022, the FATF strongly urged Myanmar to swiftly complete its action plan by October 2022 or the FATF would call on its members and urge all jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence to business relations and transactions with Myanmar. Given the continued lack of progress and the majority of its action items still not addressed after a year beyond the action plan deadline, the FATF decided that further action was necessary in line with its procedures and FATF calls on its members and other jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence measures proportionate to the risk arising from Myanmar. When applying enhanced due diligence measures, countries should ensure that flows of funds for humanitarian assistance, legitimate NPO activity and remittances are not disrupted.

Myanmar should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address these deficiencies, including by: (1) demonstrating an improved understanding of ML risks in key areas; (2) demonstrating that on-site/offsite inspections are risk-based, and hundi operators are registered and supervised; (3) demonstrating enhanced use of financial intelligence in LEA investigations, and increasing operational analysis and disseminations by the FIU; (4) ensuring that ML is investigated/prosecuted in line with risks; (5) demonstrating investigation of transnational ML cases with international cooperation; (6) demonstrating an increase in the freezing/seizing and confiscation of criminal proceeds, instrumentalities, and/or property of equivalent value; (7) managing seized assets to preserve the value of seized goods until confiscation; and (8) demonstrating implementation of targeted financial sanctions related to PF.

The FATF urges Myanmar to work to fully address its AML/CFT deficiencies and Myanmar will remain on the list of countries subject to a call for action until its full action plan is completed.

See the link below to access the notice on the FATF website

https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/Call-for-action-February-2023.html

Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring 

Jurisdictions under increased monitoring are actively working with the FATF to address strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing. When the FATF places a jurisdiction under increased monitoring, it means the country has committed to resolve swiftly the identified strategic deficiencies within agreed timeframes and is subject to increased monitoring. This list is often externally referred to as the “grey list”.

The FATF and FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs) continue to work with the jurisdictions below as they report on the progress achieved in addressing their strategic deficiencies. The FATF calls on these jurisdictions to complete their action plans expeditiously and within the agreed timeframes. The FATF welcomes their commitment and will closely monitor their progress. The FATF does not call for the application of enhanced due diligence measures to be applied to these jurisdictions. The FATF Standards do not envisage de-risking, or cutting-off entire classes of customers, but call for the application of a risk-based approach. Therefore, the FATF encourages its members and all jurisdictions to take into account the information presented below in their risk analysis.

The FATF identifies additional jurisdictions, on an on-going basis, that have strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing. A number of jurisdictions have not yet been reviewed by the FATF or their FSRBs, but will be in due course.

Since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, the FATF has provided some flexibility to jurisdictions not facing immediate deadlines to report progress on a voluntary basis. The following countries had their progress reviewed by the FATF since October 2022: Albania, Barbados, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, Haiti, Jamaica, Jordan, Mali, Morocco, Myanmar, Panama, Philippines, Senegal, South Sudan, Türkiye, UAE, and Uganda. For these countries, updated statements are provided below. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, and Tanzania chose to defer reporting; thus, the statements issued in October 2022 for those jurisdictions are included below, but it may not necessarily reflect the most recent status of the jurisdictions’ AML/CFT regimes. Following review, the FATF now also identifies Nigeria and South Africa.

See the link below to access the notice on the FATF website

https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/Increased-monitoring-february-2023.html 

High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action 

High-risk jurisdictions have significant strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and financing of proliferation. For all countries identified as high-risk, the FATF calls on all members and urges all jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence, and, in the most serious cases, countries are called upon to apply counter-measures to protect the international financial system from the money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing (ML/TF/PF) risks emanating from the country. This list is often externally referred to as the “black list”. Since February 2020, in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, the FATF has paused the review process for countries in the list of High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action, given that they are already subject to the FATF’s call for countermeasures. Therefore, please refer to the statement on these jurisdictions adopted in February 2020. While the statement may not necessarily reflect the most recent status of Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s AML/CFT regimes, the FATF’s call for action on these high-risk jurisdictions remains in effect. 

https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/documents/call-for-action-june-2022.html 

Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring 

Jurisdictions under increased monitoring are actively working with the FATF to address strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing. When the FATF places a jurisdiction under increased monitoring, it means the country has committed to resolve swiftly the identified strategic deficiencies within agreed timeframes and is subject to increased monitoring. This list is often externally referred to as the “grey list”.

The FATF and FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs) continue to work with the jurisdictions below as they report on the progress achieved in addressing their strategic deficiencies. The FATF calls on these jurisdictions to complete their action plans expeditiously and within the agreed timeframes. The FATF welcomes their commitment and will closely monitor their progress. The FATF does not call for the application of enhanced due diligence measures to be applied to these jurisdictions, but encourages its members and all jurisdictions to take into account the information presented below in their risk analysis.

The FATF identifies additional jurisdictions, on an on-going basis, that have strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing. A number of jurisdictions have not yet been reviewed by the FATF or their FSRBs, but will be in due course. 

Since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, the FATF has provided some flexibility to jurisdictions not facing immediate deadlines to report progress on a voluntary basis. The following countries had their progress reviewed by the FATF since March 2022: Albania, Barbados, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cayman Islands, Haiti, Jamaica, Jordan, Mali, Malta, Morocco, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Senegal, South Sudan, Türkiye, and Uganda. For these countries, updated statements are provided below. The United Arab Emirates chose to defer reporting to focus on its efforts; thus, the statement issued in March 2022 for that jurisdiction is included below, but it may not necessarily reflect the most recent status of the jurisdiction’s AML/CFT regime. Following review, the FATF now also identifies Gibraltar.

The FATF welcomes the progress made by these countries in combating money laundering and terrorist financing, despite the challenges posed by COVID-19.

https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/documents/increased-monitoring-june-2022.html 

High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action 

High-risk jurisdictions have significant strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and financing of proliferation. For all countries identified as high-risk, the FATF calls on all members and urges all jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence, and, in the most serious cases, countries are called upon to apply counter-measures to protect the international financial system from the money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing (ML/TF/PF) risks emanating from the country. This list is often externally referred to as the “black list”. Since February 2020, in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, the FATF has paused the review process for countries in the list of High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action, given that they are already subject to the FATF’s call for countermeasures. Therefore, please refer to the statement on these jurisdictions adopted in February 2020. While the statement may not necessarily reflect the most recent status of Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s AML/CFT regimes, the FATF’s call for action on these high-risk jurisdictions remains in effect 

Documents - Financial Action Task Force (FATF) (fatf-gafi.org) 

Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring 

Jurisdictions under increased monitoring are actively working with the FATF to address strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing. When the FATF places a jurisdiction under increased monitoring, it means the country has committed to resolve swiftly the identified strategic deficiencies within agreed timeframes and is subject to increased monitoring. This list is often externally referred to as the “grey list”. 

Documents - Financial Action Task Force (FATF) (fatf-gafi.org) 

High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action – Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Iran

http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/documents/call-for-action-february-2020.html 

 Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring 

http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/documents/increased-monitoring-february-2021.html 

Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring – 23 October 2020

https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/documents/increased-monitoring-october-2020.html

High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action – 21 February 2020

http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/documents/call-for-action-february-2020.html

http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfrecommendations/documents/virtual-assets-red-flag-indicators.html

Click here to access the document.